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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN THE LIGHT OF THE
FUNCTIONS AND DYSFUNCTIONS OF FORM
JOSEPH 3f. PERILLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
T RUMPET flourishes and drum rolls are unlikely to sound in village
squares on April 16, 1977,' to commemorate the third centennial of
the enactment of sections 42 and 173 of the Statute of Frauds. The long-
lived Statute's 250th anniversary was greeted in 1927 by England's Law
Quarterly Review, with the sardonic toasts, "Floreat iniustitia," and
"The Law-may it never be reformed." 4 Prodded by such comments,
Parliament repealed most of the provisions contained in the fourth
* Professor of Law, Fordharn University School of Law. The author wishes to express
his appreciation for the assistance given him by the Institute of Comparative Law, Uni-
versity of Florence, where this Article was written.
1. The controversy with respect to the date of enactment of the Statute of Frauds ap-
pears to have been laid to rest. See 6 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 380-84
(1927) [hereinafter cited as Holdsworth]; Costigan, The Date and Authorship of the Statute
of Frauds, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 329, 334 (1913); Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of
Frauds (29 Car. 11 c. 3) and Their Authors, 61 U. Pa. L. Rev. 283, 312-13 (1913). The
1677 date will be used throughout this Article.
2. Section 4 provided: "And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from
and after the said four and twentieth day of June no action shall be brought whereby to
charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise, to answer damages out of
his own estate; (2) or whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriages of another person; (3) or to charge any person upon
any agreement made upon consideration of marriage; (4) or upon any contract (flor sale
of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; (5) or upon
any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making
thereof; (6) unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memo-
randum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith,
or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." An Act for Prevention of
Frauds & Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 (1677) (italics deleted).
3. Section 17 provided: "And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That
from and after the said four and twentieth day of June no contract for the sale of any
goods, wares and merhandizes, for the price of ten pounds sterling or upwds, shall be
allowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually
receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part of payment,
or that some note or memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by
the parties to be charged by such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized."
An Act for Prevention of Frauds & Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 17 (1677) (italics deleted).
Section 17 was repealed but substantially reenacted as § 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 56 &
57 Vict., c. 71 (1894).
4. 43 L.Q. Rev. 1 (1927) (Editorial Note). The editors gave the date of enactment as
March 12, 1677.
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and seventeenth sections in 1954.1 Left standing were the writing require-
ments with respect to a defendant's special promise to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriages of another,6 as well as the writing requirement
governing contracts for the sale of interests in land.' In the United States,
every state except Louisiana adopted legislation patterned after the
English original.8 More recently, the same forty nine states' have enacted
the Statute of Frauds provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code1 °
which deviate in important ways from section 17 of the original Statute
even as revised in the United States by the Uniform Sales Act."' None-
theless, with a few local variations, the provisions of section 4 of the
tri-centenarian Statute remain in effect in forty nine states.
The Statute of Frauds does not stand alone and isolated in Anglo-
American history. It is well within patterns of thought, custom, and
legislation which are observable in the legal systems of the most disparate
types, including ancient Babylon, 2 the Soviet Union,18 the tribal law of
the African Akan,14 and the Code Napol6on. 5 Indeed, one would be
5. 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34 (1954) ; see 40 Cornell L.Q. 581 (1955) ; 68 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1954).
6. The English Law Revision Committee, which in 1937 had studied the Statute of
Frauds, recommended that this provision be repealed with the others. English Law Revision
Committee, The Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of Consideration: Sixth Interim Report,
Cmd. No. 5449, at 11-12 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Revision Committee] (reprinted In
15 Can. B. Rev. 585, 593-94 (1937)).
7. This was repealed and reenacted with some modifications in § 40 of the Law of
Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 40 (1925). The wisdom of retention of this provision Is
considered in Wilkinson, Law of Property Act 1925, S. 40: A Case for Abolition, 31 Con-
veyancer & Prop. Law. 182 (1967); Wilkinson, Law of Property Act 1925, S. 40: A Case
for Amendment, 31 Conveyancer & Prop. Law. 254 (1967).
8. See the table of statutes in 4 S. Williston, Contracts § 567B (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961)
[hereinafter cited as Williston].
9. 10 Williston § 1160A.
10. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1-206, 2-201, 8-319, 9-203.
11. Uniform Sales Act § 4.
12. See notes 34-37 infra, and accompanying text.
13. In the principal Soviet republic, with certain exceptions, all transactions between
individuals in which the amount in question exceeds 100 rubles, and all transactions between
public bodies or between public bodies and individuals must be in written form. R.S.F.S.R.
Grazh Kod (Civil Code) arts. 44(1), (2) (1964). The code sections can be found In Civil
Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 12 (W. Gray & R. Stults transl.
1965).
14. See Allott, Evidence in African Customary Law, in 1 Readings in African Law 83,
85 (1970).
15. There is perhaps more literature in English on the French "Ordonnance do Moulins"
of 1566 and its reenactment with modifications as article 1341 of the French Civil Code
(C. Civ. art. 1341 (73e ed. Petits Code Dalloz 1973)) than on any other form requirement
outside the Anglo-American system. See 0. Bodington, An Outline of the French Law of
Evidence 42-53 (1904); P. Herzog & M. Weser, Civil Procedure in France 321-24 (1967);
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tempted to speak of the Statute as one manifestation of a universal
cultural component,"8 but for the apparent absence of similar components
in Chinese and Japanese law. 7
The Statute laid down a rule that prescribed formalities 8 be utilized
in certain classes of contracts. For example, section 4 required that the
"agreement... or some ineinorandun or note thereof, shall be in writing,
and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person
thereunto by him lawfully authorized."' 9 Contracts for the sale of goods
valued at ten pounds sterling were subject to the same form requirement
except that the giving of "something in earnest" or the acceptance and
receipt by the buyer of part of the goods were treated as equivalent to
the written formality 20
Theorists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries believed such
requirements of form were becoming obsolescent by virtue of an evolu-
tionary process "From Formal to Formless Law." 2 'Liberty of Form"
was declared to be the touchstone of modern contract law, meaning that
parties were free to adopt any form2 2 they desired unless a particular
provision of the law declared otherwise.23 Modern observers, on the other
2 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law §§ 1104-34 (11th ed. La. State Law
Inst. transL 1939). For North American offshoots of the French system, see Johnson, Sources
of the Quebec Law of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters, 31 Can. B. Rev. 1000,
1006-16 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Johnson); 33 La. L. Rev. 344 (1973).
16. On the question of regional versus universal components in Law, see Wahl, Influences
Climatiques sur l'Avolution du Droit en Orient et en Occident-Contribution au Rfionglisme
en Droit Compare, 25 Revue Internationale de Droit Compar6 261 (1973).
17. A Japanese industrialist summed up the Eastern attitude as follows: "We, as do
the Chinese, place greater value on oral commitments than on written contracts, in apparent
diametrical contrast to Western businessmen." Fujino, Get to Know the Japanese Market,
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1973, § 3, at 15, col 3. Mr. Fujino is described as the president of the
Mitsubishi Corporation. See also J. Toshio Sawada, Subsequent Conduct and Supervening
Events 225 (1968) ("Contracts are viewed not as a set of legal claims, but as an evidence
of certain social or personal relations."). For the almost total absence of private law, as
we understand it, in the imperial Chinese tradition, see A. deRiencourt, The Soul of China
91-93 (rev. ed. 1965).
18. It has been argued that the Statute does not lay down a "form" requirement in
the traditional sense of that term. The question is discussed at note 166 infra.
19. An Act for Prevention of Frauds & Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 (1677).
20. Id. § 17.
21. This is the title of section 9 of de la Grassiere, The Evolution of Civil Law, in
Formative Influences of Legal Development 602 (A. Kocourek & J. Wigmore eds. 1918).
This was also a central theme of Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (3d Amer. ed. 1873).
22. Even a simple oral contract made with no particular ritual words has a "form." See
E. Betti, Teoria generale del negozio giuridico 126 (1955). Throughout this Article, however,
the term "form" or "formality" means any manner of expressing or memorializing an
agreement other than oral or tacit non-ritual expression.
23. For example, Swiss law states: "Contracts are valid without any special form unless
1974]
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hand, have spoken of the "renaissance of formalism"24 which has occurred
in recent decades. The realities are considerably more complex than these
generalizations suggest. While there has been an increase in the "formal-
ity" required in mercantile transactions, particularly with respect to such
matters as commercial paper, documents of title, and the recording of
security interests, these form requirements tend to be rather simple,
non-ceremonious and flexible in contrast to the forms of more primitive
times. At the same time, cumbersome, ceremonious, non-functional form
appears to be on the decline.25 In the very recent past, however, under
the banner of consumer protection, new and often complex form require-
ments have been imposed.
Over the course of its history, some prominent members of the legal
profession have given the Statute of Frauds high praise, although more
have excoriated it. Lord Nottingham, one of its draftsmen, was frequently
quoted as having said "1 'that every line was worth a subsidy.' ,,2I Lord
St. Leonard's rebuttal was: "'Every line of it has cost a subsidy.' ,"27
Chancellor Kent extolled it as "the most comprehensive, salutary, and
important legislative regulation on record, affecting the security of private
rights."2 A more recent commentator disagreed, charging that the
Statute was "ambiguous, archaic, arbitrary, uneven, unwieldy, unneces-
sary and unjust."29
the law provides otherwise." C.O. art. 11 (Payot 1962). For similar statements, see 1 E.
Cohn, Manual of German Law § 139 (2d ed. 1968); Ylbistalo, Remarks on the Finnish Law
of Contract and the Law of Torts, in The Finnish Legal System 150 (J. Uotila ed. 1966).
The apparent banality of this principle dissolves when one recalls that Roman law "took the
view that an agreement was not enforceable unless there was some reason why It should
be. At first, like other systems, it found this reason in Form." NV. Buckland, A Text-Book
of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 412 (3d ed. P. Stein 1966).
As an instrument of legal analysis, the principle of liberty of form is often used to justify
narrow construction of form requirements. It has had some currency in common law
analysis: "Enactments, also, which impose forms and solemnities on contracts, on pain of
invalidity, are construed so as to be as little restrictive as possible of the natural liberty
of contracting." P. Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes 469-70 (5th ed. F. Stroud 1912),
quoted in 2 A. Corbin, Contracts § 275, at 13 n.19 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Corbin).
24. See Muukkonen, Formal Provisions and the Elimination of their Detrimental Conse-
quences, 5 Scandinavian Studies in Law 79, 81 & n.1 (1961).
25. L. Friedman, Contract Law in America 91-95 (1965); J. Flour, Quelques Remarques
sur I'Avolution du Formalisme, in 1 Le Droit Priv6 Franqais au Milieu du xxe Siecle(ltudes
Offertes & Georges Ripert) 93, 94 (1950).
26. Revision Committee 6.
27. 43 L.Q. Rev. 1, 3 (1927) (Editorial Note).
28. 2 J. Kent, Commentaries *494 n.j.
29. Ireton, Should We Abolish the Statute of Frauds?, 72 U.S.L. Rev. 195, 196 (1938).
A great number of equally passionate comments can be arrayed. Lord Kenyon characterized
the Statute as "one of the wisest laws on our Statute Book," in Chaplin v. Rogers, 102
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Among the welter of eulogies and denunciations it is rare to find a
dispassionate evaluation of the Statute in terms of (1) its functions;
(2) the value of those functions as weighed against other values which
are thwarted or submerged by the application of the Statute; (3) the
extent to which the Statute rationally and efficiently carries out its
functions; and (4) the extent to which application of the Statute has
thwarted or submerged other values cherished by the legal system. By
examining the various legal functions which form requirements have had,
or could have had, it is proposed to determine which of the many functions
of form requirements the Statute serves, and how efficient and rational
this service is.
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF CONTRACTUAL Fo~m~A~urms
A. Magical, Sacramental and Psychological Functions
Primitive laws of promise are tightly linked to the use of ritual words
and acts. In observing "surviving primitives" such as school children,
we get a glimpse of primitive contract formation.
"In parts of Scotland ... the thumbs are wetted and pressed together. In other parts
both sides to the bargain spit on the ground. In yet other areas, and in particular
in England, children shake hands, or slap hands, or join hands and have the grasp
broken by a blow from a third party (South Molton), or stamp on each other's toes
(Knighton), or, fairly commonly, link the little fingers or 'pinkies' of their right hands
and shake them up and down, occasionally repeating some dirge as a warning to each
other: 'Ring a ring a pinkie, Ring a ring a bell, If ye brak the bargain Ye'll go to
hell.' ,"ao
We are told that" 'even the deliberately swindled' " 31 child has no redress-
Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K.B. 1800), and elsewhere stated: I lament extremely that exceptions
were ever introduced in construing the Statute .... " Chater v. Beckett, 101 Eng. Rep. 931,
933 (K.B. 1797). See also Shindler v. Houston, 1 N.Y. 261, 273 (1848); Strother v. Barr,
130 Eng. Rep. 1013, 1018 (C.P. 1828); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2093, at 464 (3d ed. 1940);
LIewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 747 (1931).
The negative comments considerably out-number the positive evaluations. Only a few
of the better known or more expressive of them need be cted. Lord Wilmot, with whom
Lord Mansfield concurred, stated: "Had the Statute of Frauds been always carried into
execution according to the letter, it would have done ten times more mischief than it has
done good, by protecting, rather than by preventing, frauds." Simon v. Metivier, 96 Eng.
Rep. 347, 348 (K.B. 1766). See also J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Com-
mon Law 180 (1898); Stephen, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 L.Q. Rev. 1
(1885). A massive number of additional critical quotations and citations can be found in
2 Corbin § 275.
30. M. Freedman, Contracts---Cases and Materials 167-68 (1973) (quoting L Opie &
P. Opie, The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren 130 (1959)). The children by their hand
rituals seem clearly to be continuing the on hand syllan of Anglo-Saxon times.
31. Id. at 167 (quoting I. Opie & P. Opie, The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren 121
(1959)).
1974]
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if the appropriate ritual is followed. What is the glue that cements this
bargain together? What factor is it that causes a child who becomes
dissatisfied with his bargain to accept it? Where the dirge is added, is this
factor the fear of damnation or is it some psychological predisposition
towards acceptance of the efficacious power of the ritual? To the extent
it is the ritual we can speak of a non-rational psychological function.
To the extent it is the fear that the curse they have pronounced will be
actuated, we can speak of a magical function."2 If one were to ask the
participants in the ritual which of these functions motivated them the
most, it is unlikely that they could supply the answer.83
In ancient Babylonia the contracting process84 involved a rather
awesome array of formalities: 1) a writing (usually on clay tablets);
2) sealing; 3) witnessing by two professional witnesses; a5 4) an oath
(which accompanied the sealing);" and 5) registration of the writing
in a public office. The oath contained a threat that the contract breaker
would be accursed of the gods, each of whom would inflict a special
punishment."1 The functions of each of these steps were manifold, but to
the extent that the contracting parties or the community seriously re-
garded the conditional curse contained in the oath to be enforceable by
supernatural sanctions, we can speak of its having a sacramental function.
32. To the extent that an oath-taker or participant in a ritual believes that breaking the
oath or other ritual promise will be penalized by a deity, it would seem appropriate to
speak of a "sacramental" function. To the extent it is believed that supernatural forces
other than deities will enforce the ritual promise, it would be appropriate to speak of a
"magical" function. For example, a Hebrew scholar argues that early in the history of the
ancient Hebrews, the awesome oaths which were taken, e.g., "Let an enemy pursue my soul,
and overtake it and tread my life down to earth; yea, let him lay my glory in the dust,"
(Ps. 7), were enforced neither by the diety nor by denomic forces. "The curse was automatic
or self-fulfilling, having the nature of a 'spell,' the very words of which were thought to
possess reality and the power to effect the desired results." Blank, The Curse, Blasphemy,
the Spell, and the Oath, 23 Hebrew U. Coll. Ann. 73, 78 (1950) (italics omitted). Only in
later times did the oath become "a type of religious expression." Id. at 95. For an affirmation
of the magical nature of early contract ritual, see Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human
Will, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 575, 584 (1943). Regarding "the inherent potency . . . of words,"
see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37, 442
P.2d 641, 643-44, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 563-64 (1968).
33. Cf. C. Jung, Man and His Symbols 64 (Dell ed. 1968). "You may ask many civilized
people in vain for the real meaning of the Christmas tree or of the Easter egg. The fact is,
they do things without knowing why they do them." Id.
34. The concept that form requirements are in essence a required procedural pattern of
contracting appears in Muukkonen, supra note 24, at 84.
35. C. Johns, Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts and Letters 81 (1904).
36. Id.
37. See 1 Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law 585 (A. Kocourek & J. Wigmore eds.
1915).
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To the extent that the entire formal procedure for entering into a contract
impressed upon the psyches of the contracting parties the rightfulness
of fulfilling their promises even if subsequently they appeared disadvan-
tageous, we can speak of a psychological function.
Although in primitive and ancient law the sacramental and psycho-
logical functions of form were frequently found intertwined, as in the
Babylonian formalities, this was not always so. The Roman law of
contract had strict formalities. Whatever may have been the early religious
background of Roman law, it became thoroughly secularized, but never-
theless retained its highly formalistic character in many respects 8 The
central contracting device, the stipulatio, required that the parties be in
the presence of each other and say the appropriate ritual words. If they
failed to carry out the ritual in any particular, there was no contract."
The efficacy of the ritual was so well known to the Roman populace
(its effectiveness lasted for about one thousand years prior to Justinian's
Code),4 that the promisor who at the appropriate moment said,
"Spondeo" in reply to the promisee's "Dari spondes?"1' would be
psychologically impressed with the rightfulness of the promisee's sub-
sequent call upon him to perform his promise. Later this Article will
discuss a related function of contract formality, the "cautionary"
function,' where the stress is upon the conscious, rational processes of
the mind. Here the emphasis is on unconscious, non-rational patterns of
thought.43 Ritual is one of the means by which the unconscious mind
38. See note 39 infra.
39. "Our starting point is free from doubt. The stipulatio was an abstract oral form which
by its own force created an obligation ... . It could be proved in any manner . . . and
although the written document which attested it was always treated as an easy and ready
means of proving the stipulation and was therefore widely resorted to in practice, such
document was devoid of any value and completely without legal force, if the oral solemnity
had not in point of fact taken place." S. Riccobono, Stipulation and the Theory of Contract
1 (Wylie transL 1957).
40. Its use goes back to at least the XII tables. W. Buckland, supra note 23, at 434. The
XII tables date from about 450 B.C. Id. at 1.
41. The formalities in the course of time came to be relaxed somewhat; other words
were allowed. Even as relaxed, the ritual required that the parties be in the presence of
each other, that it be oral, that it be uninterrupted, and that the answer should be re-
sponsive to the question. Id. at 434-35; G. Grosso, II Sistema romano dci contratti 130-31
(3d ed. 1963). At no time were either witnesses or a writing required. W. Buckland, supra
at 434-35.
42. See text accompanying notes 85-99 infra.
43. What is here called the "psychological" function of form would by some psychol-
ogists be called a "numinous" function. A ritual or symbol is "numinous" when it can
"enforce or bring about a standard of accomplishment that would be unattainable to con-
scious effort." C. Jung, Psychological Types 300 (1949). "There is also a quality of awesome-
ness about it!' A. Dry, The Psychology of Jung, A Critical Interpretation 195 (1961). The
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can be reached and made to submit to the conscious. 44
To have this effect, however, the ritual must be in tune with the tradi-
tions and current beliefs of the culture in which the individual has been
reared.45 Although in tune with Roman society, the Roman stipulatio
proved grievously wanting when spread throughout the empire. Eastern
Mediterranean cultures recognized and respected the written agreement
but were not responsive to this exotic oral ritual transplanted from abroad.
In an attempt to conform to Roman requirements by artful draftsman-
ship, they tended to recite in the written agreement that the oral stitulatio
had taken place. Time after time such agreements were struck down
when it was proved that the recital was false.40 When a required form
such as the oral stipulation in the eastern Mediterranean is regarded as
an unnecessary bit of legalistic nonsense, it fails to serve a healthy
psychological function. No matter what other functions the form may
serve (evidentiary, cautionary, etc.), it becomes dysfunctional and will
be discarded first by the persons subject to the law and then by the law
itself.4 7 In the middle of the sixth century A.D., Justinian promulgated
a law providing that full faith and credit normally would be given to a
recital that the stipulation had taken place, thus reconciling law and
practice.48
numinous function is accomplished by the integration of the unconscious with the conscious.
Id. at 300. The term "numinous" is not employed in the text of this Article because it Is
not in general usage.
44. J. Breuer & S. Freud, Studies in Hysteria (Strachey transl. 1957) (case history of
Mrs. Emily von N.).
45. "It appears with the passage of time the 'aura' of a symbol disappears, it becomes
'saturated with consciousness' and no longer has the same effect of reconciling conscious
and unconscious." A. Dry, supra note 43, at 194.
Sometimes, the social psychology of a given culture endows a particular type of con-
tractual content with special force. For example, the typical military officer of the nine-
teenth century felt that his honor demanded the fulfillment of gambling "obligations" even
where the legal system did not regard them as binding; but as a type he tended to be less
punctilious about his obligations to tradesmen than was a typical member of the middle
classes. See J. Kohler, The Philosophy of Law 139 (1921).
46. There is a good deal of controversy among students of Roman law as to the his-
torical development of the stipulation. See S. Riccobono, supra note 39, which is totally
devoted to the historical development of this form of contract. For a summary discussion,
see W. Buckland, supra note 23, at 435-37.
47. Savigny suggested that any law maker who would attempt to ordain formalities of
the Roman type would succeed only in causing the contracting parties to stage a comedy.
For the form to be effective it is necessary, he argued, that the parties be "penetrated ...
by the importance and significance of the act. . . .Such forms originate, rather, from the
unconscious plastic forces of a people ... ." 3 F. di Savigny, Sistema del diritto romano attuale
§ 130, at 18 (V. Scialoja transl. 1900) (author's translation). As a rationalistic approach Is
taken towards law, formalities which had been pentrating languish and disappear. Id.
48. It could still be shown, however, that one of the parties was not present in the city
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Similarily, a millenium later the ceremony of impressing a private
seal onto sealing wax was virtually abandoned by the American populace
and replaced by a scribble, which in turn was replaced by the letters
"L.S." pre-printed on a blank document. Judges and legislators took
note that the ritual of sealing had lost its grasp on the psyches of con-
tracting parties and reduced the legal consequences of the presence or
absence of a seal.4 9 In England most of the provisions of sections 4 and
17 of the Statute of Frauds fell into complete disrepute within the com-
mercial and legal fraternities 0 while the rest of the community was
largely unaware of their existence.5 The English Parliament took note
and abolished the offending provisions 2
The Statute of Frauds was not enacted to serve a sacramental or
psychological function. Rather, the draftsmen sought to cure, or at least
to circumvent, certain deficiences of the law of evidence and common law
procedure 3 Parties who formalize their contracts in writing do not
normally have the psychological function in mind. They often formalize
agreements, even if the Statute of Frauds does not so require, for a variety
of "down to earth," "hard headed," "practical" reasons, some of which
will be discussed later in this Article. The psychological effect of putting
the transaction in writing should not be minimized, however. The same
need for the psychic unconscious to be dominated, placated, or integrated
which possessed ancient man exists today. This need is served by utilizing
in which the stipulation was said to have taken place on the stated day. Code 8.37.14. See
W. Buckland, supra note 23, at 437; S. Riccobono, supra note 39, passim.
49. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 120 (1970). It is interesting to note that
while England has repealed substantial portions of the Statute of Frauds, the seal as a
device for contracting without consideration survives. See G. Cheshire & C. Fifoot, The
Law of Contract 19-20 (7th ed. 1969). Moreover, the seal and attesting witnesses continue
to be required for certain transactions. Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 73 (1925).
See S. Phipson, Manual of the Law of Evidence 284 (9th ed. Elliott 1966).
50. See 6 Holdsworth 396, and sources cited in note 29 supra.
51. "The lay public know nothing about the Statute of Frauds .... " Recommendation by
a Minority as to Guarantees, in Revision Committee 33. A random survey of 58 persons in
the Salt Lake City area indicates that this statement is quite accurate as applied to the
United States. Note, An Appraisal of the Utah Statute of Frauds, 9 Utah L. Rev. 978,
995-96 (1965).
52. See text accompanying note S supra.
53. The deficiencies were that first, there was no effective judicial control over jury
verdicts, and second, that the parties, their spouses and any persons having an interest in
the litigation were incompetent to testify. 6 Holdsworth 388-89. It has been suggested that
an additional underlying cause for enactment of the Statute was the immaturity of the
law of contracts at the time, doctrines such as consideration having not as yet been fully
worked out to safeguard promisors. Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism,
3 Ind. L.J. 427, 431 (1928). On this point, see discussion in text accompanying notes 158-
62 infra.
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such formal procedural patterns of contracting as survive in the
modern world,54 or, to some extent, by putting the agreement into
writing. 5 The tendency, however, has been for ritual form to lose its
magical or sacramental character and for its psychological functions to
be submerged into evidentiary and other rationalistic functions."s
Despite this tendency, to the extent that the Statute of Frauds induces
contracting parties to reduce their agreements to writing, the Statute may
be said to serve the psychological function of form requirements. Does
it, however, do so in a rational manner? The Statute's choice of agree-
ments which must be reduced to writing has struck many observers as
arbitrary and irrational. 7 With this criticism as a premise, critics have
tended to deduce that the Statute ought to be repealedY8 From the same
premise, however, one could argue with equal strength that the Statute
ought to be extended to a broader set of contract types. 0
B. Earmarking and Classifying Functions
1. Earmarking of Intent to Contract
One of the perplexing decisions that all legal systems have had to make
is the determination of the point at which parties have passed negotiation
and have entered into a contract. Compliance with prescribed formalities
such as the recital of ritual words, the imprint of a seal on sealing wax,
delivery, notarization, and, to some extent, compliance with writing re-
54. See, e.g., text accompanying note 155 infra.
55. It has been suggested that there is a need for sociological research into "what
role writing plays in popular belief and whether it has not become a veritable form of
contract rather than a means of proof." J. Carbonnier, 4 Droit civil-Les Obligations 140 (6th
ed. 1969) (author's translation). Very often, one hears (usually erroneously) from nonlawyers
in New York: "There was no contract, just a verbal agreement." A Russian author has one of
his characters say: "What I hear constantly at the factory is: '... . Let's have it in writing.'"
A. Solzhenitsyn, For the Good of the Cause 37 (Sphere Book ed. 1971).
56. See F. di Savigny, supra note 47, § 130, at 320; Levy-Bruhl, R6flexions sur le
Formalisme Social, 15 Cahiers internationeaux de sociologie 53, 58-59 (1953); Rabel,
The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 L.Q. Rev. 174, 178-82 (1947).
57. See part V infra.
58. See note 230 infra.
59. "The topics included in the Statute of Frauds are so fragmentary and the phrasing
of the act is so indefinite that a radical revision should be made . . . . If [a] writing Is
needed at all, it should not be limited merely to the subjects enumerated in the act, but
should include all important agreements, i.e., those involving more than a specified amount."
Hutton, The Need to Simplify the Formal Requisites of Contracts in Mississippi by Re-
vising the Doctrine of Consideration and the Statute of Frauds, 7 Miss. L.J. 294, 306-07
(1935).
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quirements, are said, somewhat overstating the case, to be "infallible signs
of the maturity of deliberations.""0 One need not generally inquire, under
the prevailing objective theory of contract, whether a party who has
complied with such formal requirements actually intended to be legally
bound.6 The correlative effect of the use of such an "infallible sign"
is what Professor Fuller has called a "channelling" function.12 When
the law provides that clothing a promise with a particular formality will
transform the promise into an obligation, the formality has at least two
functional consequences. First, the judicial task of determining the parties'
intentions is facilitated. Secondly, and of equal importance, it enables the
parties to search out and find the appropriate device to accomplish their
intent to create an obligation. In Professor Fuller's phrase, the legally pre-
scribed or recognized formality "offers channels for the legally effective
expression of intention."Is
The Roman stipulatio was one such form," and medieval law knew
various forms which had this function, including the ritual hand-grasp,
the payment of earnest, often in the form of beer or wine, the oath, and
the pledge of faith.65 Such a form continues to exist in those Anglo-
American jurisdictions which have retained the pristine effectiveness of
the private seal.66 An earmarking form exists in Pennsylvania, where the
use of a prescribed written statement under the Model Written Obliga-
60. 3 F. di Savigny, supra note 47, § 130, at 317 (author's translation); see also Levy-
Bruhl, supra note 56, at 61.
61. There are, of course, exceptions. Parol evidence is admissible in most American
jurisdictions to establish that the parties to a written and apparently complete contract had
orally agreed that the terms of the writing would be inoperative. Nice Ball Bearing Co. v.
Bearing jobbers, Inc., 205 F.2d 841, 845-46 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 US. 911 (1953).
It frequently is held that one may show the existence of an oral condition precedent to
the formation of the apparent contract. Cosper v. Hancock, 163 Colo. 263, 430 P.2d go
(1967); Hicks v. Bush, 10 N.Y.2d 488, 180 N.E.2d 425, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1962).
62. The term "channelling function" is a very apt one. It has, however, been more
widely employed to convey an unrelated concept and for that reason it is not utilized here.
For example, one frequently sees references to the "channelling function" of provisions of
the tax laws, to refer to attempts by the state to cause private investment funds to be
channelled into certain areas of industry, commerce or mineral exploration. For a similar use
see L. Friedman & S. Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences 198 (1969). For Professor
Fuller's use of the term, see Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 801-03
(1941).
63. Fuller, supra note 62, at 801.
64. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 151 infra.
66. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Introductory & Statutory Notes to §§ 95-110,
at 189-98 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965); 1 Williston §§ 205-19A.
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tions Act will accomplish an intent to be bound. 7 Certain other devices
may in some circumstances also operate as an earmarking device. 8
Compliance with the Statute of Frauds does little to satisfy the ear-
marking function of form for several reasons. First, a writing and
signature sufficient to comply with the Statute does not eliminate the
uncertainty as to whether the parties have left the area of preliminary
negotiations. 69 Second, the accomplishment of the parties' intent to be
bound requires that, in addition to the written form requirement, the
transaction be supported by consideration. The Statute does not provide
that compliance with its terms will render an agreement enforceable; it
merely indicates that non-compliance will render a promise unenforce-
able.70 Nevertheless, an occasional judicial decision has been influenced
by the idea that one objective of the Statute is to lay down a clear and
positive rule to determine when a contract has been made.
71
2. Earmarking the Transaction Type-Classifying Function
Discussions concerning what is here called the earmarking function
have tended to focus on the utility of form prescriptions as devices for
the separation of legally effective transactions from those which are void
67. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 6-8 (Purdon 1967). This was originally proposed In 1925
as the Uniform Written Obligations Act, 9C U.LA. 378. This Act makes enforceable a
promise made in a signed writing "if the writing also contains an additional express state-
ment, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound." Id.
68. One such device is the use of nominal consideration. Normally consideration, in the
sense of "bargained-for exchange," is a concept dealing with the content of the agreement.
Where nominal consideration is accepted as sufficient, it serves as a formal element extrinsic
to the bargain-in-fact. See generally von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration:
An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1009, 1053-55 (1959). There is a
large element of uncertainty in American law as to the efficacy of nominal consideration.
See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 49, at § 58. Another such device, reminiscent of
late Roman practice (note 39 supra) is the use of a false recital of consideration. In a
minority of American jurisdictions, the parties will be estopped from denying that the con-
sideration was in fact paid. See, e.g., Real Estate Co. v. Rudolph, 301 Pa. 502, 153 A. 438
(1930).
New York has a network of statutes which permit a signed writing to substitute for
consideration in a variety of circumstances. See J. Calamari & 3. Perillo, supra §§ 92-96, at
164-69. Written form substitutes for consideration in a number of jurisdictions when
the promise is to pay a debt that has been barred by the statute of llmitatlons or by
bankruptcy proceedings or to perform a promise that is avoidable on the grounds of
infancy: See id. §§ 83-85.
69. For an illustrative case, see Scheck v. Francis, 26 N.Y.2d 466, 260 N.E.2d 493, 311
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1970), in which the court indicated that, even if the Statute of Frauds were
satisfied, one of the parties had manifested an intention not to be bound until the Inte-
grated writing had been executed. See also 2 Corbin § 517.
70. Fuller, supra note 62, at 802.
71. E.g., Rondeau v. Wyatt, 126 Eng. Rep. 430 (C.P. 1792).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
or unenforceable. Within the category of legally effective transactions it
is often also of prime importance to determine the type of transaction.
"A business man must be able to tell at a glance whether he is taking
commercial paper or not." 2 The free flow of commerce hinges upon such
ready classification. For this reason, form requirements for commercial
paper are generally more rigid than for contracts and evidences of in-
debtednesses. Another reason for this greater rigidity in many countries is
to allow court officers to determine, without undue cogitation, whether
the instrument is entitled to the very special procedural privileges to
which holders of commercial paper are so often entitled 3 Very often
statutes of limitation 4 and rules of substantive law differ depending upon
the classification of a transaction as commercial or non-commercial, as a
sale or as a service contract.
Bentham, the most influential theoretician of the Anglo-American law
of evidence, proposed that for each species of contract, "let a distinct
species of paper be provided." Thus "farm-lease paper" would be a
different legislated form from "house-lease paper," and "lodging-lease
paper,"7 5 etc. The use of these forms would be mandatory," a require-
ment which would be widely publicized by the state. Each form would
contain an essay on the law governing the kind of transaction for which
it was drafted.
It does not appear that any legal system has adopted Bentham's "ear-
marking" approach in its entirety.77 It is clear, however, that the Statute
72. Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 750 (1919).
73. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213 (McKinney 1970) (motion for summary judgment
in lieu of complaint). For even greater procedural privileges av-ailable to enforce com-
mercial paper in Europe, see M. Cappelletti & J. Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy 320-21
(1965); R. Ginsburg & A. Bruzelius, Civil Procedure in Sweden 351-52 (1965); P. Herzog
& M. Weser, supra note 15, at 491-93.
74. The four year period of limitations established by U.C.C. § 2-725 as to contracts
for sale is, in many jurisdictions, shorter than the period of limitations applicable to other
contracts. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 1972) (6 years).
75. 2 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, bk. 4, ch. 3, § 2 (1827).
76. Although the use of the appropriate form would be legally required, it is extremely
important to point out that the penalty for non-compliance would ordinarily be that
proof of the alleged contract would be subject to a higher standard of proof than the
normal one. Id. §§ 2-3.
77. There are, of course, legislative provisions which carry out some aspects of the
Bentham approach. For example, in New York there is legislation that provides forms for
powers of attorney and defines the legal effect of the forms. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §§ 5-1501
et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1973). The use of these forms is not mandatory. Also there are
statutes that prescribe the form of certain kinds of policies of insurance. See, eg, N.Y.
Ins. Law § 168 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
More to Bentham's point, however, are some of the formal requirements of recent con-
sumer protection legislation. See text accompanying notes 116-29 infra.
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of Frauds neither directly nor indirectly encourages such earmarking.
Although the Statute does divide contracts into various classes, there is
nothing in the operation of the Statute which induces the parties to in-
dicate into which class their contract falls. The main reason that parties
earmark their transactions is that labelled forms are readily available at
the stationer's. Indeed the main problem in this area seems to be the
parties' concerted misbranding of their transactions: partnership agree-
ments are disguised as loan transactions to protect financiers from part-
nership liability; 7 mortgages are disguised as conveyances in an attempt
to provide greater security to the creditor; 79 usurious loans are masked as
sales with repurchase rights; 0 and schemes to confound the tax-collector
are legion."- In situations like these the common law is often willing to
look behind the form of the transaction 2 and to hear testimony to over-
come the appearance created by the parties,8" especially to protect the
interests of third persons who have relied in good faith upon the appear-
ance of the transaction. 4 With all of these problems, however, the Statute
of Frauds is unconcerned.
78. See J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Partnership § 19 (1968).
79. See Fogelman, The Deed Absolute as a Mortgage in New York, 32 Fordham L. Rev.
299 (1963).
80. Kline v. Robinson, 83 Nev. 244, 428 P.2d 190 (1967); Horn v. Keteltas, 46 N.Y.
605 (1871) ; see also In re 716 Third Ave. Holding Corp., 340 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 913 (1965); Carter v. Zachary, 243 Ark. 104, 418 S.W.2d 787 (1967).
81. Sometimes they work. See, e.g., the matter of the "disguised donation" in France,
where what originated as a tax dodge has become an important transaction type. A. von
Mehren, The Civil Law System: Cases & Materials for the Comparative Study of Law
634-40 (1957).
82. Whether at this point we have strayed from a discussion of form in the sense of
the "manner of expressing or memorializing an agreement" (note 22 supra) into a dis-
cussion of the content of contract types is an interesting question which will not be pur-
sued here.
83. See notes 78-81 supra, and cases cited therein. Civil law countries appear far more
restrictive in admitting testimony to contest the existence of the transaction. See Lemann,
Some Aspects of Simulation in France and Louisiana, 29 Tul. L. Rev. 22, 29-30 (1954);
Rives, Simulation in the Civil Law, 10 Tul. L. Rev. 188, 199-200 (1936) (Argentina).
84. Protection may be accorded under the doctrine of estoppel. D'Oench, Duhme & Co.
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N.Y. 192, 5 N.E.2d
196 (1936).
Third parties are also protected by the rule that a bona fide purchaser for value takes
free of latent equities. F. Lawson, Introduction to the Law of Property 44, 56 (1958).
Compare Italian C. Civ. art. 1415 (Hoepli 1961) (translated in The Italian Civil Code 362
(M. Beltramo, G. Longo & J. Merryman transl. 1969)). "Simulation cannot be used as a
defense by the contracting parties . . . against third parties who, in good faith . . . have
acquired rights from the apparent owner of the right . . . ." Id.
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C. The Cautionary Function
A Texas statute provides that, with certain exceptions, an arbitration
agreement must be made "upon the advice of counsel to both parties as
evidenced by counsels' signatures. '' s1 This required formality seems de-
signed to force the parties to receive advance warning of the nature and
consequences of an arbitration agreement and, probably, to deter the
insertion of arbitration clauses in standard form adhesion contracts.8a
This statute also serves an earmarking function in the sense that one can
be certain under Texas law of the proper procedural pattern needed to
create a binding arbitration agreement. Nonetheless the impression is that
the legislation was designed with the cautionary effect primarily in mind.
Many formalities, usually less cumbersome (and less expensive) than the
Texas arbitration requirement, serve this cautionary function. In earlier
days, "[t]he affixing and impressing of a wax wafer--symbol in the
popular mind of legalism and weightiness-was an excellent device for
inducing the circumspective frame of mind appropriate in one pledging
his future."18 7 In a good many legal systems, a highly trained legal pro-
fessional, ss usually called a notaire, notaio, or related title, must draft and
supervise the execution of certain contracts as a pre-requisite to their
validity. Clearly one function of these requirements is to caution the
promisor that he is entering into a binding relationship. Correlatively, as
a result of the formality of the transaction, the expectancies engendered
in the promisee are frequently of a higher order than in the case of a
more casually expressed promise.
Of all the kinds of transaction that have been singled out by legislative
act or judicial decision for rigorous form requirements, four recur with
great frequency: promises to make gifts, promises to guarantee the credit
of another, marriage settlements, and real estate transactions.8 If we set
85. lA Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 224 (1973).
86. See Carrington, The 1965 General Arbitration Statute of Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 21,
33-37 (1966); Dougherty, Proposed 1965 Texas General Arbitration Act, 27 Texas B.J.
945-46 (1964); 44 Texas L. Rev. 372 (1965). In an interesting parallel, a German arbitration
agreement is ineffective if it appears in an agreement which contains any other subject
matter. This effectively forecloses the burial of an arbitration clause in a lengthy standard
form agreement. See Schlesinger, The Notary and the Formal Contract in Civil Law, Ap-
pendix to Acts, Recommendation and Study Relating to the Seal and to the Enforcement
of Certain Written Contracts, in 1941 Report of the [N.Y.] Law Revision Commission 403,
405.
87. Fuller, supra note 62, at 800.
88. On the qualifications, training and supervision of notaries in civil law countries, see
m. Cappelletti & J. Perillo, supra note 73, at 65-67; Schlesinger, supra note 86, at 403-14.
89. Schlesinger, supra note 86, at 404-05.
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aside the question of real estate contracts for the moment,10 we can
isolate common threads running through the remaining categories. First,
each is normally gratuitous, and second, each is normally made to, or on
behalf of, a close friend, a relative, or a prospective spouse or in-law. In
this context the earmarking function of form requirements is quite im-
portant. It is very easy, often years later, to construe words expressing
high hopes and favorable omens as words of promise or vice-versa. 1
Form requirements can serve to sort out promises from expressions of
sanguine expectations. As such, form requirements are aids to judicial
administration and also offer an earmarking instrument for parties to
accomplish their gratuitous aims. Their cautionary function is equally
important. It is perhaps too simple when introducing a relative or
friend to a merchant or banker to praise his credit-worthiness in terms
that exceed a mere credit reference and spill over into phrases that promise
to make good his default. 2 But where the law requires a notarial or
other solemn form or even merely a written form, there is greater oppor-
tunity for reflection and deliberation on the wisdom of taking upon one-
self the burden of another's obligation. The default of the friend or
relative which at first appeared unthinkable can be better understood upon
reflection as a genuine risk. Once this risk is comprehended, an affirmative
decision to make the guarantee in proper form can be accepted by the
legal system as a deliberate and serious act of volition.03 Moreover, it is
likely to be accepted by the promisor himself as his legitimate obligation,
thereby serving the psychological function of form requirements. What
has been said with respect to a guarantee of the obligation of a friend
or relative could be repeated as to promises made in contemplation of
90. See text accompanying note 230 infra.
91. A creditor may "torture mere words of encouragement and confidence into an abso-
lute promise ...." Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1891) ; see Fuller, supra note 62,
at 804 n.6.
In addition, where there is a close relationship, opportunities for fraud and undue influ-
ence increase. Form requirements may act as a deterrent to the extraction of consent
through such devices. See Comment, Contracts for the Sale of Land: Subscribing Wit-
nesses?, 24 U. Fla. L. Rev. 155, 159-60 (1971).
92. Apparently it was also deemed to be too simple for a pleader to cast an oral promise
of suretyship into the guise of a fraudulent representation of creditworthiness, thus circum-
venting the Statute of Frauds. Consequently, England and several other common law
jurisdictions enacted legislation to the effect that no action can be based upon a repre-
sentation of credit unless the representation be made in writing and signed by the party to
be charged. See generally Taylor, The Statute of Frauds and Misrepresentations as to the
Credit of Third Persons: Should California Repeal its Lord Tenterden's Act?, 16 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 603 (1969).
93. See Rabel, supra note 56, at 178.
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marriage. Indeed, the very closeness of the relationship of the parties
serves to accentuate each of the problems discussed above.
Since the provisions of the Statute of Frauds calling for a signed writ-
ing for promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriages of
another and for promises made in contemplation of marriage have similar
counterparts in other legal systems," presumably these provisions serve
a genuine need. Yet, it may be noted that the Statute of Frauds does not
distinguish between gratuitous sureties and paid sureties. None of the
rationales supporting the imposition of special form requirements for
gratuitous promises justifies the imposition of those special requirements
on paid sureties. Interestingly, the form requirements for suretyship
promises in a number of legal systems are removed or relaxed for com-
mercial transactions,!5 a class that naturally includes a greater number
of cases in which paid sureties are employed.
Promises to make gifts, even more than suretyship promises, have been
singled out for special attention by legislatures and courts. 0 The Statute
94. It will be recalled that the Statute of Frauds provision which requires a "special
promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriages of another" to be in writing
has been retained in England despite the repeal of the greater part of the Statute. See
text accompanying notes 5-7 supra. Under the law of Scotland a subscribed writing is
required. Otherwise the guarantee "shall have no Effect." Mercantile Law Amendment Act
of 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 60 § 6 (Scot.). It is debatable whether the ancient Scottish
authentication statutes also apply. If so, a guarantee exceeding £100 Scots must be in
writing and signed by two attesting witnesses. See A. Walker & N. Walker, The Law of
Evidence in Scotland 108-09 (1964). Countries which have writing requirements for all
contracts over a certain minimum amount do not generally single out guarantees for special
treatment. Countries which lack such a general requirement are more likely to single out
suretyship, as does Switzerland (Rabel, supra note 56, at 184-85), Kenya (2 P. Durand,
Evidence for Magistrates 213 (1969)), Nigeria (J. McNeil & R. Rains, Nigerian Cases and
Statutes on Contract and Tort 39 (1965)), South Africa (L. Hoffmann, The South African
Law of Evidence 223 & n.11 (1970)), and Ethiopia (Civil Code Proclamation, arts. 1725,
1727 (1960)).
95. In France, all transactions governed by the Code de Commerce are exempt from
the writing requirements of the Code Civile. See P. Herzog & M. Weser, supra note 15,
at 322. In Germany, a writing is not required for a guaranty governed by the Commercial
Code. See Moses, International Legal Practice, 4 Fordham L. Rev. 244, 259 (1935).
At the time of enactment of the Statute of Frauds, the law merchant was in the process
of integration with the common law. It would be most interesting to discover to what
extent the Statute of Frauds was applied outside of the courts of common law to mercantile
transactions before the process of integration came to an end. It is at any rate clear that
today the Statute of Frauds is not applicable in admiralty. Kossick v. United Fruit Co,
365 US. 731 (1961).
96. Any conclusions based on this observation ought to be guarded. A primary concern
of much of this legislation in civil law jurisdictions is absent in common law jurisdictions
where testamentary freedom is the rule. Civil law jurisdictions which severely limit testamen-
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of Frauds makes no reference to such promises for the simple reason
that, at the time of its enactment, a gift promise was enforceable only if
another formality-the seal-were used. Where the legal effect of the
seal has been diminished or abolished, gift promises are unenforceable
except to the extent that legislation provides for the enforcement of cer-
tain gratuitous promises if other form requirements have been utilized."
These new form requirements serve a cautionary function and have been
imposed for much the same reasons as have been discussed above in
connection with suretyship. Indeed, the statutes that were adopted
in many common law jurisdictions in the nineteenth century requiring a
written form for new promises to pay debts discharged by passage of time
or by bankruptcy, or disaffirmed because of infancy, were likely a legis-
lative response to many of the same concerns as surround the pure gift
promiseY5
To the extent that the Statute of Frauds has influenced the habits of
the nation by encouraging the reduction of contracts to writing, it serves
the cautionary function. It cannot, however, be said to provide such
service in a consistent and orderly manner. For example, if the party to
be charged writes a letter repudiating his agreement, the letter may serve
as a sufficient memorandum of the agreement.09 Moreover, one may ques-
tion whether the statutory categories are a carefully considered selection
of the types of contract about which a twentieth century legal system
ought to encourage particular deliberation.
D. The Clarifying Function00
A form requirement, particularly the requirement of a written or
notarial form, influences the content of the contract. When parties proceed
tary freedom also regulate the substantive and formal requirements of gifts and promises to
give. On these form requirements, see Schlesinger, supra note 86, at 406-07.
97. See note 67 supra.
98. The leadership in this context was exercised by Lord Tenterden's Act, 9 Geo. 4,
c. 14, 1111 I, V (1828), applicable to infants' contracts and the effect of acknowledgements
on the statute of limitations. Statutes requiring that the ratification of infants' contracts be
in writing were found, by one study, to be in effect in nine American states. See 1938 Report
of the [N.Y.] Law Revision Commission 139. Although the situation with respect to
infants' contracts has been radically changed in England by the Infants Relief Act of 1874,
37 & 38 Vict., c. 62, the requirement of a written acknowledgement for tolling the statute
of limitations was reenacted by the Limitation Act of 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 21, § 24(1).
Statutes in most American jurisdictions require a written acknowledgement to toll the
statute of limitations, although part payment is often treated as the equivalent of a written
acknowledgement. 1 Williston § 164. Some have a writing requirement for a new promise
to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy. Id. § 158.
99. 2 Corbin § 511; 4 Williston § 579.
100. Professor MacNeil has used the term "planning function" to cover much of the
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to draft a written instrument, they frequently uncover points of dis-
agreement which are then worked out prior to execution. In addition,
details not considered in the oral arrangement are likely to be dealt with
in writing. Referring to form requirements for federal contracts, one
court has said: "To avoid ambiguities, mistakes, and omissions of detail
... they are to be drawn up after carefully prepared legal forms, to be
furnished by the Secretaries .... "I"
The desirability of avoiding "ambiguities, mistakes, and omissions of
detail" is not universally acknowledged. A leading Japanese industrialist
has written of the discomfort and apprehension felt by Japanese business-
men when faced with the "American insistence on spelling out the smallest
details in writing."' 2 His attitude is reflected in the lack of either
writing requirements or of a parol evidence rule in the Japanese legal
system.13 There is a genuine possibility, then, that a legal system may
wish not to induce the parties to thrash out the potential difficulties in
advance, but to induce on-going informal dispute resolution in the course
of the contractual relationship.104 Whatever approach an American busi-
nessman may wish to make in an intercultural transaction with Japanese
businessmen, there is little doubt that in domestic transactions he ordi-
narily prefers to settle possible points of dispute before they arise. To the
extent that the Statute of Frauds induces such preventive settlement,
then, it appears to serve a clarifying function in step with American
cultural preferences. The role of the Statute in serving this clarifying
function, however, is probably not of great significance. The Statute does
not require the spelling out of the smallest details in writing,' although
it may be that when the parties are induced by the Statute of Frauds to
draft a writing they will also consider and reduce to writing small details.
They may, for example, purchase a printed form which provides for many
of the details they would not have foreseen; or they might consult an
ground discussed here as the "clarifying function." L MacNeil, Cases and Materials on
Contracts 1316 (1971). The author does not follow his lead because what is described later
in this Article as the "managerial function" has perhaps as much to do with planning as
what is discussed here under the heading of "clarifying function."
101. South Boston Iron Co. v. United States, 18 CL CL 165, 176 (1883), affd, 118 US.
37 (1886).
102. C. Fujino, supra note 17, at 15, coL 6.
103. There is one writing requirement. In a broker transaction, the broker is required
to make a memorandum of the transaction and deliver copies of it to the parties. The
Great Court of Judicature has held that failure to comply with this provision neither affects
the validity of the transaction nor the ability of the parties to prove the transaction by
other evidence. See Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society 517-18 (A. von
Mehren ed. 1963).
104. Id. at 41 et seq.; J. Toshio Sawada, supra note 17, at 226; Fujino, supra note 17,
at 15, cols. 3-4.
105. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 49, at § 309.
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attorney, who would make use of "legal forms," or form books to remind
him of details he otherwise might have overlooked.
Far more effective than the Statute of Frauds in accomplishing the
objective of preventive law is the requirement in many countries that
certain contracts be made by notarial act. This requirement is intended
to insure that the parties will receive legal advice and that the instrument
will be drafted by a qualified draftsman.00 Such a requirement, however,
would not be viable in the United States where no corps of professional
notaries, civil law style, exists.107
E. Managerial Function
If there were no Statute of Frauds it is quite likely that at least in the
modern industrial sector of the economy there would be no increase in
the use of oral rather than written contracts. Form requirements are
imposed not only by law, but also by business management's desire to
control subordinate employees and agents. Salesmen are sent into the
field with order blanks which state: "'This order taken subject to ac-
ceptance by seller's authorized agent at point of shipment.' ")108 With
clauses of this type management inhibits its salesmen from entering into
contracts at prices that are not profitable, with specifications that cannot
be filled, and with quantities which are not available. Besides controlling
subordinate personnel by use of required forms, written contracts are
needed "if files are to be kept straight, and officers informed, and depart-
ments coordinated, and the work of shifting personnel kept track
of .... ,,1 19 The writing also permits a uniform administration of contrac-
tual relationships despite personnel changes.
It is not surprising that the largest of organizations-government-
should have among the most stringent form requirements."' While many
factors may contribute to these strict procedures, one of the more basic
is "[t] hat it may be readily known in what liabilities the numerous con-
tracting officers are involving the Government."'' Government form re-
106. Schlesinger, supra note 86, at 407.
107. See authorities cited at note 88 supra.
108. Ammons v. Wilson & Co., 176 Miss. 645, 170 So. 227, 228 (1936).
109. Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 747.
110. The rigidity and formality of government contract procedures are sometimes
described as excessive and anachronistic. See A. Sandulli, Manuale di diritto amministrativo
442-43 (9th ed. 1966). The greater formality of government contracts is not strictly a
modern development. See, for example, the text of a public works contract entered into
about the year 300 B.C. by the Greek city of Eretria in 1 J. Wigmore, A Panorama of
the World's Legal Systems 354-58 (1928). Each citizen of the community was required
to take an oath that he would abide by the contract or be disenfranchised.
111. South Boston Iron Co. v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 165, 176 (1883), aft'd, 118 U.S.
37 (1886). See also Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
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quirements also check subordinate officials who might otherwise enter
into improvident and extravagant contracts."-" In addition, they tend to
prevent officers and agents of the government from creating liabilities
for which there is no appropriation.11 s In short, governmental form re-
quirements are designed in part to serve the same managerial function as
are form requirements imposed by management on subordinate personnel
in private enterprise.
The Statute of Frauds, of course, does not purport to serve a managerial
function. The Statute focuses on the rights of the contracting parties.
It is largely unconcerned with relationships within private or public
enterprise.
F. Publicity Function
Form requirements may be imposed for the protection of third persons
and thereby also to aid the free flow of commerce. A prospective pur-
chaser or mortgagee of real property, for example, is protected by the
recording acts from unrecorded prior mortgages. Since recording often
presupposes that the transaction recorded has been put into written
form, a recording requirement is frequently a form requirement.114
Registries in many places have been expanded to encompass not only land
transactions but also title to and security interests in automobiles, ships,
boats, and airplanes. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, security
interests in all kinds of goods and in many kinds of intangibles are
subjected to writing and filing requirements. Filing is designed to protect
other creditors who may, prior to extending credit, ascertain whether or
not certain security interests exist in the assets of the person seeking
credit. Equally important, filing is designed to protect secured creditors
against transfers of assets to persons who could claim to be good faith
purchasers for value- 5
112. To the effect that government form requirements are designed to "prevent executive
officials from excessive or inappropriate spending," see United States v. American Renais-
sance Lines, Inc, 494 F.2d 1059, 1062 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3034
(U.S. July 27, 1974), (No. 74-25); cf. Op. [N.Y.] Att'y Gen. 161-62 (1915).
113. Op. [N.Y.] Atty Gen. 162 (1915).
114. Property recording acts frequently require that the contract, conveyance or other
instrument in question be itself recorded, or that it be presented to the recording office for
examination or copying. This is not always so, however. The filing system instituted by
the Uniform Commercial Code § 9-302(1) merely requires that a financing statement be
filed. The financing statement is not the transaction itself, but a simple identification that
a "security agreement" has been entered into.
115. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-203 also provides that unless the debtor has
signed a security agreement, it is not enforceable against him unless the secured party Is
in possession of collateral The official comments make it clear that this rule is designed
primarily to serve an evidentiary function.
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The Statute of Frauds is not designed to publicize transactions.
Although the Statute may induce parties to formalize their agreement,
such formalization does not require publicity.
G. Educational Function
One of the more modem functions of form requirements may well be
called the "educational function." Strange as it may be to those who
posited sovereignty of the will as the basis of contract, 1" a compelling
problem of modern contract law is the ignorance of contracting parties
of the terms of their contracts. The utilization of standardized printed
contract forms"17 by large industrial and commercial companies has re-
sulted in a situation in which contracting parties are frequently unin-
formed as to the content of the printed form. Since the form is offered
on a take it or leave it basis, generally it is not read, although the hand-
written or typewritten portions are often read to ascertain whether the
optional parts of the transaction (e.g., color, model, type, quantity,
delivery date, etc., in a sale of goods transaction) have been accurately
transcribed.
In an effort to cope with the realities of mass marketing, modern
legislation has attempted to cause the party supplying the printed form
to educate the adhering party as to certain important terms. Under the
Uniform Commercial Code the exclusion of a warranty of merchantability
must specifically use the word "merchantability" and, if in writing, the
exclusion must be conspicuous." 8 Exclusion of an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose must be in writing and must be con-
spicuous."' Other legislation has mandated the use of a particular size
of print for the effectiveness of certain transactions.120 The "Truth in
Lending Act '12' requires that finance charges be revealed without ob-
fuscation. Requirements that certain clauses be signed separately are in
part designed to create an awareness of their existence. 22 Legislation
116. See generally Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1954).
117. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943).
118. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(2). The term "conspicuous" is defined at Id.
§ 1-201(10).
119. Id. § 2-316(2).
120. See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 302, 403, 413 (McKinney Supp. 1973) (install-
ment credit agreements); id. § 46-c(a) (McKinney 1962) (wage assignments less than
$1,000).
In England certain statutes "set out the formal requirements in great detail and oven
specify the size of the lettering and the colour of the print and paper." 1 J. Chitty, Contracts
77-78 (23d ed. 1968).
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970).
122. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205 (firm offers). This approach appears to have
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which conditions the effectiveness of certain clauses upon their being
handwritten also serves this educational function." The requirement
that each party be supplied with a copy of the contract may also serve
this function in a different way.2 4 After contracting, the adhering party
can more fully acquaint himself, at his leisure, with the rights and
obligations of the contract by studying his copy. Interestingly, the British
Contracts of Employment Act provides that, not later than 13 weeks
after he is hired, an employee must be given a written statement detailing,
inter alia, the method of computation of his pay, hours of work, vacation
time, and the existence and nature of pension plans.1"
been pioneered in Italy. See Italian C. Civ. art. 1341 (Hoepli 1961) (translated in The
Italian Civil Code 346-47 (M. Beltramo, G. Longo & J. Merryman transl. 1969) [herein-
after cited as Beltramol) which imposes this requirement for a wide variety of clauses.
"[T]he ratio legis of the formal requirement is to give a party, faced with a mass of
clauses, an opportunity to have knowledge and realize the significance of the one-sided
clauses which are mixed with other clauses and are scattered here and there in a standard
form." Gorla, Standard Conditions and Form Contracts in Italian Law, 11 Am. J. Comp.
L. 1, 13 (1962). Professor Gorla adds, "[there has been a flood of litigation, as is often
the case when one tries to solve problems of this kind by imposing a formal requirement."
Id. at 20.
A requirement that bidders on certain federal government contracts fill in certain blanks
and separately sign conditions with respect to minority hiring was "imposed so that bidders
would be adequately impressed by the importance of the action requirements, and that
if bidders took the time to complete all blank spaces properly they would know in detail
what the Government expected of them in this area during contract performance." Report
by Comptroller General to the Department of Labor, B-179100(2), Feb. 28, 1974, in
CCH Gov't Cont. Rep. f 90,112. The cited report recommends abolition of these require-
ments as unduly cumbersome.
123. French C. Civ. art. 1326 (56e ed. Petits Code Dalloz 1957) (text set out in H.
deVries & N. Galston, Materials for the French Legal System 42 (1969)) requires that a
unilateral promise to pay a sum of money or to give anything of value must be wholly
in the handwriting of the promisor or, in addition to his signature, contain the promisor's
handwritten words "good for" or "approved" and the handwritten sum of money or thing
which is promised. The usual explanation given in France for this provision is the pre-
vention of fraud as where the instrument is for an amount greater than the sum orally
represented by the promisee, or where the instrument is in blank. See 2 M. Planiol & G.
Ripert, supra note 15, at § 1155; A. von Mehren, supra note 81, at 624-25.
124. E.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 405 (McKinney 1962) (retail installment sales). The
French Civil Code requires that there be as many originals as there are persons having a
distinct interest in a bilateral contract. French C. Civ. art. 1325 (56e ed. Petits Code
Dalloz 1957) (text set out in H. deVries & N. Galston, supra note 123, at 41). Bentham
rather quaintly labelled this kind of formality as "multiplicate scription." 2 J. Bentham,
supra note 75, bk. 4, ch. 1, § 4. Apparently, the provision was originally adopted for
evidentiary reasons. It was feared that a person not in possession of an original could not
enforce his rights. See 2 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, supra note 15, at § 1144; A. von Mehren,
supra note 81, at 623. Discovery devices are almost non-existent in the Napoleonic Codes.
See P. Herzog & Ml. Weser, supra note 15, at 233, 319.
125. Contracts of Employment Act 1963, c. 49 § 4.
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Only recently, however, has the law gone beyond requiring devices that
call attention to certain terms of the contract to mandate that the ad-
hering party be instructed of his statutory obligations or rights with
respect to a contract. An Italian statute requires that certain retail install-
ment sales contracts must describe the legal effect of the promissory notes
signed by the purchaser.126 Legislation in the United States requires that
the customer be informed of his right to rescind certain consumer credit
transactions127 and certain other transactions, particularly home solicita-
tion sales.1 28 Thus, in small and limited ways the law is moving towards
Bentham's suggestion of a century and a half ago that different contract
types be labelled and contain an essay on the law applicable to the
transaction. 129
The concerns of the draftsmen of the Statute of Frauds were remote
from those which inspire the modem educational function of form. It
cannot be said that the Statute's purpose over the years has changed to
encompass this function.
H. Regulatory and Taxation Functions
Government's interest in and regulation of the content of private con-
tracts has increased greatly in the last century. Regulations of the
content of contracts tends to produce the requirement that the contract
be in writing. For example, an Italian statute aimed at requiring high
minimum down payments in retail installment sales, and providing for
criminal penalties for violation, requires that contracts covered by this
legislation be in writing.' This writing requirement appears largely to
be designed as an aid to the policing of the economic regulation.181 In the
People's Republic of China the requirement that leases and sales of
houses be in written form and registered is said to be for "supervisory"
reasons;" 2 the form requirement is an aid to policing a sector of economic
activity. Price control and anti-trust legislation or regulations in non-
socialist societies may require that notice of certain kinds of transactions
126. Law of September 15, 1964, No. 755 (Regolamentazione della vendita a rate), art. 2,
1 5 (Italy). The legal effects of promissory notes in civil law countries, including Italy, are
far more drastic than in the common law. See note 96 supra.
127. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970).
128. E.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 425-30 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
129. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
130. Law of September 15, 1964, No. 755 (Regolamentazione della vendita a rate), art. 2,
Ill (Italy).
131. For another function, see text accompanying note 126 supra.
132. Pfeffer, The Institution of Contracts in the Chinese People's Republic, 4 Harv. Int'l
L. Club J. 1, 30-31 (1962).
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be sent to regulatory bodies.' 33 Although the transaction of which notice
is sent may be oral, the notification requirement may well tend to induce
parties to put their agreement in writing so that it may stand the test of a
possible investigation. The Israeli Standard Contracts Law of 1964 per-
mits a party who wishes to use a standard contract form in his dealings
with customers to apply for approval of the restrictive terms. 34 Such a
law may be an incentive to the preparation of standardized written forms.
Although its purpose may be to control the fairness of such forms, at the
same time it would give the proponent of the form a high degree of cer-
tainty as to its effectiveness and validity.
The interaction of state regulation of the content of a contract with
form requirements may on occasion minimize those requirements. If the
state dictates the content of fire insurance policies, an oral contract will
sufficiently fulfill the clarifying function that is so important in insurance
matters. There will be no doubt about its terms and, therefore, the policy
can be upheld as sufficiently definite." 5 In striking contrast, the modem
Ethiopian Civil Code which in general does not require formalities in con-
tracting,13 6 singles out the insurance policy for form prescriptions. The
policy must be in writing and signed by all parties and two attesting
witnesses.'37 This leads one to suspect that the content of insurance
policies is not closely regulated in Ethiopia.
Somewhat extraneous from the kinds of government regulation just
considered is the requirement in a number of countries that a stamp or
other revenue duty be paid on the transaction. Failure to pay such a tax
may have the effect of rendering the transaction void. 3 8 Generally, how-
ever, the rule is merely that the written contract is inadmissible as evi-
133. See, e.g., 3 W. Blake, Business Regulation in the Common Market Nations 392
(1969).
134. The statute in English translation can be found as an appendix to Lando, Standard
Contracts--A Proposal and a Perspective, 10 Scandinavian Studies in Law 127 (1966).
On the statute, see also Hecht, Israel Law on Standard Contracts, 3 Israel L. Rev. 586-94
(1968); Note, The Israeli Standard Contracts Law, 5724-1964, 14 Intl & Comp. L.Q.
1410 (1965).
135. See 12 J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §§ 7191-205 (1943); 3 G.
Richards, The Law of Insurance § 384 (5th ed. W. Freedman 1952).
136. "Unless otherwise provided, no special form shall be required and a contract shall
be valid where the parties agree." Civil Code Proclamation, art. 1719(1) (1960) (Ethiopia).
137. Id. arts. 1725(b), 1727(1), (2) ; cf. Note, The Requirements of Writing In Contracts
of Insurance-An Exercise in Comparative Law, 6 Israel L. Rev. 112 (1971).
138. Byington v. Oaks, 32 Iowa 488 (1871); Sawyer v. Parker, 57 hie. 39 (1869). For
the United Kingdom this is the explicit statutory rule. A document which ought to be
stamped but is not "shall not, except in criminal proceedings, be given in evidence, or be
available for any purpose whatever .... ." Stamp Act of 1891, 54 & 55 Vict., c. 39, § 14(4);
see P. Herzog & M. Weser, supra note 15, at § 7.40.
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dence of the transaction unless the fiscal duties have been paid."'
Compliance with such fiscal legislation may have a tendency towards
formalizing transactions-one cannot paste a revenue stamp on an oral
transaction. Although it is possible to pay a registration tax upon an oral
transaction, 4 it is simply easier to deal with a tax-collector if there is a
piece of paper to file or exhibit rather than an oral transaction to ex-
plain.' In some countries there appears to be little compliance with such
tax laws except in the event of litigation, when the tax with penalties is
paid.' 42 This kind of tax has been described as "a tax upon justice, which
is perhaps the worst of all taxes."'14 3 At any rate, it is clear that the taxation
function of form is totally extrinsic from any connection with the regula-
tory function of form in general and has very little connection with any
other of the functions of form discussed in this Article. It is even clearer
that the regulatory function of form, including the taxation function, is
unrelated to any original intent of the Statute of Frauds or any subse-
quent development of the Statute, with perhaps one exception. The Statute
of Frauds has been extended in a number of jurisdictions to require a
written form whenever a promise is made to pay a brokerage commission
on a realty contract.4 Such statutes seek, in a way, to regulate a profes-
sional calling which has been subject to abuses. 45
I. Evidentiary Function
A primary function of contractual formalities is, of course, to supply
and preserve evidence of the contract. Some European countries recognize
a customary rustic method of keeping accounts by wooden tallies and
checks. 40 In the American west "staking a claim," although not con-
139. See P. Durand, supra note 94, at 236 (Kenya); P. Herzog & M. Weser, supra
note 15, at § 7.40 (France); P. Sarkar & S. Sarkar, Law of Evidence 746-51 (12th ed.
1971) (India); Phillips, The Italian Registration Tax, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 811 (1968) (Italy).
140. See Phillips, supra note 139, at 812-13.
141. In some countries one of the functions served by the requirement that certain
transactions be drafted by a notary is to have the notary police the fulfillment of certain
fiscal duties. See Schlesinger, supra note 86, at 407.
142. See P. Herzog & M. Weser, supra note 15, at 325 n.454; cf. Phillips, supra note 139,
at 811-13.
143. This remark was made by John Bowring in an editorial note to 6 The Works of
Jeremy Bentham 514 (1838-43 ed. Bowring 1962 reprint). For a similar argument to the
effect that the use of the rules of evidence as tools of fiscal policy violates fundamental
rights, see M. Cappelletti & V. Vigoriti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Litigants in Civil
Proceedings: Italy, in Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation 511, 539-
40 (1973).
144. 2 Corbin § 416, at 437 & n.92.
145. See id.
146. "Talies consist of two fragments of wood, coming from a single piece, spilt down
the middle . . . . Upon each delivery the tally and counter-tally are put together and they
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tractual, involved formalities for acquiring mineral rights and for proof of
their acquisition.147 Many evidentiary formalities such as these have
existed and still exist in contemporary times. 48
In times and places where literacy is not prevalent, a frequent
form requirement is that a transaction be witnessed by a number of
persons. King Canute required all sales above the value of four pence
to be made in the presence of four witnesses. 4" The Kings of Kent
required that if a man of Kent bought anything in London, it "be done in
the presence of two or three good citizens or of the mayor of the city." ' °
The requirement that there be witnesses was an additional precaution and
did not displace pre-existing formalities which had psychological, ear-
marking, cautionary and publicity as well as evidentiary functions. In
Anglo-Saxon times, "the handgrasp (on hand syllan), the oath (A6,
juramentum), and the pledge of good faith (trjjwa)"''11 were some of the
available devices for other than real contracts.82 The situation in
make on both of them a transversal cut called coche. The number of cuts prove the number
of deliveries when the cuts on both sticks correspond." 2 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, supra
note 15, at 658. A similar but perhaps more sophisticated use of wood fragments as pre-
constituted evidence would appear to have been used in China. See 39 Sacred Books of the
East 121, 133 (1891 ed. J. Legge transL 1968 reprint).
On the sometimes successful, sometimes unsuccessful attempts to introduce tallies into
evidence in medieval England, see T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law
58-59, 633 n.3 (5th ed. 1956); H. Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law and its
Institutions 184, 188, 205 (4th ed. A. Kiralfy 1958). Tallies with seals attached were ap-
parently quite important in medieval English commerce. See C. Fifoot, History and Sources
of the Common Law 223-25 (1949).
147. See Harvey v. Ryan, 42 Cal. 626 (1872) (custom that a notice of claim be posted
on the ground).
148. See, e.g., 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *295: "If a deed be made by more
parties than one, there ought to be regularly as many copies of it as there are parties, and
each should be cut or indented (formerly in acute angles instar dentium, like the teeth
of a saw, but at present in a waving line) on the top or side, to tally or correspond with
the other; which deed, so made, is called an indenture." Id. (italics omitted).
149. These and similar requirements of other rulers are summarized in I S. Greenleaf,
A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 358-59 (15th ed. 1892).
150. Id. at 359 n.3.
151. Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early English Law, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 605,
609 (1910). A revised version is published in Association of American Law Schools, Selected
Readings on the Law of Contracts 1, 2 (1931). The witnesses are described as a "collateral
precaution." Pollock, Contracts in Early English Law, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 392 (1893).
A revised version is published in Association of American Law Schools, supra at 10, 13.
152. "Real" or "in rem" contract was the term used to describe transactions relating
to money, goods or lands in which there was part or full performance by one side at the
making of the contract, such as a sale or a loan. Even in real contracts, however, a formality
often substituted for the performance. For example, the giving of something in earnest
would bind a contract of sale. This normally consisted of a penny ("God's penny" or
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England did not differ markedly from that in the rest of Europe.18 The
handgrasp or hand-slap as a contractual requirement continues to be
demanded by rural custom in parts of Europe,'5 4 and the oath, as a
formality that binds, survives in canon law,15  and perhaps in American
military'56 and constitutional law.157
Eventually, the written and sealed form was added to earlier require-
ments. The contract under seal, often with the recital of an oath or the
pledge of good faith, and often with attesting witnesses, became the
contract par excellence in later medieval England.5 8 Whatever other
functions the sealed covenant may have had, it clearly provided a lasting
form of evidence. Even more secure devices for the preservation of
"earnest money") and a drink of wine or beer. T. Plucknett, supra note 146, at 630, 665.
Since the witnesses were also often compensated by a drink, the contract could become
the "pretext for copious libations." J. Brissaud, A History of French Privato Law § 373,
at 494 n.2 (2d Fr. ed. R. Howell transl. 1912).
153. See J. Brissaud, supra note 152, at §§ 374-75; R. Huebner, A History of Germanic
Private Law § 71 (F. Philbrick transl. 1968); 4 A. Pertile, Storia del Diritto Itallano
470-74 (2d ed. 1893).
154. See Camera di commercio industria e agricoltura Firenze, Raccolta di usi e con-
suetudini commerciali e agrari della provincia de Firenze tit. 1, § 6 (1965). Today's handgrasp
appears to descend from other hand to hand rituals. J. Brissaud, supra note 152, at § 374;
R. Huebner, supra note 153, at 494-95 ("the illuminations of the Sachsensipegel (sic] show
us a form a manual ritual in which the parties to the contract simply laid the palms of their
hands together, holding them above their heads .... "). Compare the rituals of British school-
children described in text accompanying note 30 supra.
155. At one time it was the teaching of the Canonists that all promises intentionally
made were binding in conscience unless founded in an immoral cause. See Vinogradoff,
Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence, 24 L.Q. Rev. 373, 382 (1908).
This is no longer the case. The canon law has "canonized" civil law, meaning that it regards
as binding those promises which the law of the state whose secular law is applicable
regards as binding unless they are contrary to divine law. See 6 P. Augustine, A Commentary
on the New Code of Canon Law 590 (1923) (Can. 1529). In the middle ages where the
Courts Christian asserted jurisdiction, breach of contract was punishable by a Judgment for
damages. See the judgments of the court of the Bishop of Ely, collected in F. Maitland &
W. Baildon, The Court Baron 115-18, 125, 139, 144 (4 Selden Society Series 1891). At present,
canon law continues to regard a promissory oath as binding under penalty of sin. See 6
P. Augustine, supra at 312. (Can. 1317).
156. United States ex rel. Norris v. Norman, 296 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (enlistee
who did not sign oath of loyalty is a civilian although he performed military duties and
received military pay). There is a conflict of authority on the point. See Dilloff, A Con-
tractual Analysis of the Military Enlistment, 8 U. Richmond L. Rev. 121, 124-25 (1974).
157. This was the opinion of the House Committee on the Judiciary. See, e.g., House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on the Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of
the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in 120 Cong. Rec. H 8967-68
(daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).
158. See Plucknett, supra note 146, at 631.
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evidence were available in those legal systems that required-or per-
mitted-the covenant to be made and registered in a public place:
carved in marble in Greek temples, imprinted on clay tablets at the
Babylonian law court, or kept in the archives of a notary.
In seventeenth century England three major developments in the case
law of contracts coincided with a major development in the law of evi-
dence. First, by expansion of the writ of assumpsit, a written and sealed
instrument was no longer a necessary requirement for the legal enforcea-
bility of a promise made in exchange for a mere promise.1' 9 In the event
of a dispute upon an alleged contract, a jury trial was required without
the necessity of written evidence. Second, the courts held that debts
for money loaned, goods sold and delivered, etc., could be collected
through the action of assumpsit rather than the action of debt. 0° This
meant that a vast new class of cases would be tried by jury rather than
wager of law. Third, the relative independence from the common law,
enjoyed by merchants, was being diminished rapidly as the courts of
common law expanded their jurisdiction at the expense of mercantile
tribunals.' 6 ' This meant that another large class of cases would be tried by
jury. While these three developments led to a great expansion of jury
trials of contract litigation, a fourth development was the creation and
solidification of rules barring testimony by a party to the action or other
interested person including relatives of a party.10 2 The significance of
this was that although disputes surrounding oral contracts were to be
tried by jury, the participants and those closest to them could not be
heard. It is believed that these four developments had a great deal to do
with the enactment of the Statute of Frauds in the same way that similar,
but earlier, developments had led to the promulgation of legislation else-
where which served as a model for the English Parliament.33 The best
known of these statutes, and the one most likely to have been studied
by the English draftsmen of the Statute of Frauds, was the French
Ordonnance of Moulins of February, 1566, which excluded testimony
attempting to prove agreements exceeding the value of 100 livres. The
preamble to the Ordonnance is highly illuminating:
159. Strangborough v. Warner, 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B. 1589).
160. Slade's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1603).
161. H. Potter, supra note 146, at 183-210.
162. 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 29, at § 575; 2 M. Cappelletti, La Testimonlanza della
Parte nel Sistema dell'Oralita 421-81 (1962).
163. See generally Rabel, supra note 56, at 174-78. There were a large number of fore-
runners in Italian and French legislation going back at least as far as the thirteenth century.
See 4 A. Pertile, supra note 153, at 469-70.
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[T]o obviate the multiplication of facts heretofore put forward for judgment, all
subject to proof by witnesses and to the disqualifications to which those are liable,
from which there result numerous inconveniences and complications of procedure.104
Obviously this legislation was designed as much for the sake of facilitating
judicial administration as for the protection of the parties against
perjury.' How was the legal system to cope with the embarrassing
dilemma of recognizing the validity of oral contracts, entrusting disputes
to an evidentiary trial rather than trial by ordeal or by wager of law,
and at the same time excluding the testimony of the persons who are most
likely to have knowledge of the facts? The answer in France, and later
in England, was found in the requirement that agreements of specified
kinds be put in writing. Thus the issues would be reduced and the pro-
ceedings shortened.
The evidentiary function of the Statute of Frauds was clearly the
basic aim of its draftsmen. 6' Written evidence would aid the cause of
doing justice between man and man, and at the same time assure the
smooth functioning of the machinery of justice. Parliament could have
returned to the evidentiary formalities of pre-conquest days1 7 and have
required that transactions of certain kinds be made in the presence of
disinterested witnesses. Witnesses, however, die; paper (of pre-twentieth
century quality) lasts for centuries. Witnesses' memories fade or become
distorted with the passage of time; the written word does not change.
Witnesses are subornable, but forgery is a difficult art. Paper is readily
available, while the marshalling of disinterested witnesses may be difficult
and expensive.'0
164. The translation is in Johnson, supra note 15, at 1011.
165. See 3 V. Marcad6, Corso elementare di diritto civile francese lib. 3, sez. II, at 522
(4th Fr. ed. Logatto transl. 1857).
166. Because the purpose of the Statute is to provide evidence rather than to prescribe
a substantive precondition to validity, it has been suggested that the Statute does not
prescribe a form requirement at all. Sharp, Promissory Liability, 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 250,
262 (1940); cf. L. Friedman, supra note 25, at 94. Nonetheless, insofar as it fulfills many
of the same functions as substantive form requirements, it becomes a form requirement.
There are, of course, differences in concept and consequences between forms required ad
substantiam and those required ad probationem, but the similarities are greater than the
differences.
167. See text accompanying notes 149-58 supra.
168. Documentary evidence has not always been regarded as inherently superior to
testimony. See A. Engelmann, A History of Continental Civil Procedure 678 (1927) (wit-
ness proof regarded as superior to documentary evidence by a medieval jurist); H. Lea,
Superstition & Force 56 (4th ed. rev. 1910) (wager of law overcame charters) ; 2 M.
Planiol & G. Ripert, supra note 15, at 646 (medieval maxim was: "witnesses surpass letters").
In England, see 38 Edw. 3, stat. I, c. 5 (1363) (compurgation superior to documentary
evidence).
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Of the evidentiary formalities that legal history teaches us have been
mandatory from time to time,"' few are more simple than the require-
ment that the "agreement... or some memorandum or note thereof, shall
be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith .... I'll
Most of those which were simpler (the use of ritual words, the handgrasp
or hand-slap, and other physical rituals) did not solve the problem of
the disqualification of the parties and their relatives as witnesses; even
if the ritual were performed, how would it be proved? Not for another
century and a half was any serious suggestion made that the testimonial
disqualification of the parties be removed. 171 Thus in 1677 Parliament
had good reason to impose contractual form requirements and, in view of
the general increase in literacy, to choose a relatively simple, non-cere-
monial formality that conformed to the abilities and perhaps to the habits
of the community 72 But at what cost?
L. DISADVANTAGES AND DYSFUNCTIONS OF FoP,.i
The preceding discussion has shown (1) that there are many substantial
advantages to be gained by the imposition of contractual formalities; 173
(2) that the Statute of Frauds serves the psychological and evidentiary
functions of form reasonably well; (3) that it performs the earmarking,
cautionary, and clarifying functions only modestly; (4) that it serves
the regulatory function only in a special category; and (5) that it
achieves the managerial, publicity, and educational functions probably
169. No attempt is made here to be exhaustive, but consider some of the more popular
alternatives: (1) holography; (2) writing with a seal; (3) writing with attesting witnesses;
(4) a writing cut into two pieces (the indenture); (5) a "public act" drafted by a notary or
other public official; (6) a writing authenticated by a notary or other public official;
(7) a writing registered; (8) "multiplicate scription."
170. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 (1677).
171. 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 29, at § 576 n.1, attributes to Bentham the earliest
attack on these disqualifications.
172. It has been suggested that section 4 of the Statute of Frauds applies to those
verbal provisions which, before the passing of the Statute, were probably in most instances
reduced to writing, but not necessarily. Smith v. Surman, 109 Eng. Rep. 209, 213 (K.B.
n829); see Rabel, supra note 56, at 177.
173. The discussion has not been exhaustive. Professor MacNel has suggested that
difficult form requirements may also be imposed as a deterrent to the making of certain types
of contracts. L MacNeli, Cases and Materials on Contracts 1315-16 (1971). He attributes
this "Kafkaesque" function of form requirements to Professor von Mehren. See von Mehren,
Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 Harv.
L. Rev. 1009 (1959). Although MacNeil appears to misread von Mehren, it may well
be that certain form requirements are imposed for deterrent purposes. See J. Calamari &
J. Perillo, supra note 49, at § 367.
Savigny suggested that there was an esthetic function of form, pointing out that in primi-
tive times verbal forms tended to be poetic. 3 F. di Savigny, supra note 47, at 317.
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not at all. Why then, have criticisms of the Statute been aimed primarily
at securing its repeal rather than its improvement?
The classical arguments against form requirements have been first, that
they restrict the sovereignty of the individual will-that is, they interfere
with freedom of contract; second, that form requirements are incon-
venient and slow the pace of business; and third, that noncompliance
with form requirements permits a party to renege on his pledged word,
thereby defeating the justified expectations of the other party. 74
In reply, it may be said that the common law never really adopted the
sovereignty of the individual will as a contractual principle, and in the
civil law its existence as a principle in the twentieth century is, at best,
dubious." 5 It is also doubtful whether writing requirements significantly
slow the pace of business. Even in the absence of such requirements,
modern business tends to reduce its commitments to writing, and non-
business transactions are not normally made at so hectic a pace as to
inhibit a written memorandum. The argument that form requirements
hamper the expeditious conduct of everyday affairs was largely aimed
at more cumbersome form requirements: the notarial instrument, the use
of ritual words, the impression of seals upon melted wax, and the like. It
has little relevance to form requirements such as those imposed by the
Statute of Frauds.
However, the third objection to form requirements is, as applied to
the Statute of Frauds, both vital and serious. In the final analysis it may
not be "just and decent" to decide a case merely on the basis of non-
compliance with form requirements. 170 Insistence on form requirements
has been described as a "strict and legalistic approach which sacrifices
equity in the individual instance."'1 1 One may add that rules of form
unduly favor the party who has easy access to legal advice over the party
who does not.' Decision of a dispute on the basis of form requirements
means, in effect, that each individual must sink or swim on his personal
knowledge of rather esoteric law. Moreover, encouragement of written
contracts in this age of mass marketing frequently means that the party
who sells, leases, or buys goods or services on a mass basis will draft the
174. These arguments are summarized in Flour, supra note 25, at 95. Other arguments are
summarized by Muukkonen, supra note 24, at 83.
175. See Gorla, La "Logica-illogica" del consensualismo o dell' incontro del consensl
e il suo tramonto, 12 Rivista di Diritto civile I, 255 (1966) ; Gorla, Le Potere della volonth
nella promessa come negozio giuridico, 54 Rivista del diritto commerciale 1, 18 (1956).
176. Muukkonen, supra note 24, at 83.
177. Danish Committee on Comparative Law, Danish and Norwegian Law 71 (1963).
178. "Ihering explains that the extreme formalism of Roman law was supportable in prac-
tice only because of the constant availability of legal advice, gratis." Fuller, supra note 62,
at 802 (italics omitted).
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contract with his own interests foremost in mind. In sum, whatever the
general advantages of form requirements, they have as great a potential
for working injustice in specific cases.
The tension between the general laudability of form requirements and
attempts to do justice in the individual case has tested courts of common
law and equity to the utmost, often with highly creative results." 0 A
"creative" decision designed to do justice in the individual case may
cause a problem, however, in that it creates precedent which can be dis-
distinguished from an "ordinary" case only by tortuous logic devoid of
common sense or policy content,""0 i.e., the type of logic which laymen
quite properly would regard as legalistic hair splitting.
IV. CUTTING THE KNOT: A TENTATIvE SUGGESTION
Suppose that the American legal system was like that of Turkey, which
has a writing requirement in the Statute of Frauds tradition,18' and (if we
can believe what we read) in which
[t]here are no loopholes... no procedural hurdles for one wishing to take advantage
of the Statute, like the requirement of pleading it as an affirmative defense; no ame-
liorating influence of equity or the law of quasi-contracts to find other ways of enforc-
ing a bargain.'8 2
If that were the state of American law one has little doubt that the
outcry from the legal profession would be such that the Statute would not
long remain unamended. ss The principal disadvantage of form require-
ments-possible injustice in individual cases-is aggravated when the
penalty for non-compliance is voidness or unenforceability.1's Parliament
179. See the comment of Lord Wllmot, note 29 supra, made less than one hundred years
after the enactment of the Statute.
180. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 213-15 infra.
181. "Legal transactions to establish, transfer, convert, renew, state, satisfy, or release
a right must be proved by a written instrument if the same exceeds five thousand kurus
(50 T.L.) in value." Introduction to Turkish Law 170 (T. Ansay & D. Wallace eds. 1966).
182. D. Karlen & L Ansel, Civil Litigation in Turkey 85 (1957).
183. This is not to say that the apparent rigidity of the Turkish rule does not meet
the needs of Turkey. That it does, is suggested by the following remark, the accuracy
of which I have no way of evaluating: "[Elxperience has shown the utter unreliability of
oral evidence in the territories formerly forming part of the Ottoman Empire." 2 C. Hooper,
The Civil Law of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 130 (1936). "Experience shows that In a
country where there is a low degree of literacy, the custom of the people is to take par-
ticular care to reduce their agreements and contracts to writing: and in the territories form-
ing part of the former Ottoman Empire this is particularly the case, owing to the facilities
afforded by the institution of the Notary Public, of which advantage is taken by all ca
of the people. Experience in the Courts also shows that it is very rarely that the parties
fail to reduce their contracts to writing." Id. at 129.
184. It has been said that "in the view of some earlier writers the neglect of a formal
1974]
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decided in 1677 that such an extreme penalty would be imposed.'85 Courts
of equity and common law have since mitigated the penalty by the doc-
trine of part performance, the imposition of constructive trusts, the fic-
tions of quasi-contract, the main purpose rule, the joint obligor rule, and
a variety of other devices, of which promissory estoppel has become a
recent favorite. 86 All of these are ingenious and creative, but often
erratic and undependable, means of escaping an exaggerated statutory
penalty. Some of these devices, particularly the doctrines of part per-
formance and promissory estoppel, are employed in situations where
acts by the plaintiff pursuant to an oral or insufficiently memorialized
agreement provide corroborating evidence of the existence of the agree-
ment.187 Other kinds of events could well corroborate the existence of the
requirement in the nature of things leads to invalidity. . . The current Scandinavian legal
writings stress the point that invalidity is not the only 'natural' legal consequence of failing
to observe a formal provision, but rather that invalidity is only one possibility among
others. There is in other words a modem trend in favour of diversifying the sanctions."
Muukkonen, supra note 24, at 86 (emphasis and footnote deleted). For an example, see
Danish Committee on Comparative Law, supra note 177, at 79. For some English examples,
see 1 Chitty, supra note 120, at 78.
185. Section 4 stated that "no action shall be brought" while section 17 stated that
"no contract .. . shall be allowed to be good." 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §§ 4 & 17 (1677). An
early interpretation was that the Statute rendered non-complying contracts void. G. Cheshire
& C. Fifoot, supra note 49, at 182. Today, except in a few jurisdictions, non-compliance Is
held to make a contract unenforceable. 2 Corbin § 279; 3 Williston § 527.
Lord Kenyon, relatively alone among common law lawyers, lamented the fact that
"exceptions were ever introduced in construing the Statute." Chater v. Beckett, 101 Eng.
Rep. 931, 933 (K.B. 1797).
186. See Note, The Doctrine of Estoppel Gains a Foothold Against the Statute of Frauds,
1 Capital U.L. Rev. 205 (1972). The techniques used by Anglo-American courts to cut
down the penalties for the non-observance of form requirements have their equivalents else-
where. For example, in France, narrow construction of the statutory requirements and broad
construction of the exceptions has greatly reduced the importance of the French equivalent of
the Statute of Frauds. Flour, supra note 25, at 112-14. Cases looking very much like estoppel
also can be found in continental law. See R. Schlesinger, Comparative Law: Cases-Text-Ma-
terials 381 (2d ed. 1959) ; Muukkonen, supra note 24, at 88-89. Restitution is also generally
available, but the question of whether expenditures in reliance on the agreement may be in-
cluded is often a debatable one. Id. 90-94; cf. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context,
73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208, 1219-22 (1973).
187. It is very likely that the part performance doctrine had its origin as an outgrowth
of the concept of "livery of seisin" rather than in evidentiary considerations. Pound, The
Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 933-50 (1920). The present function
of the doctrine, however, ought not to be confused with its origin. Rather, today the
doctrine represents a mixture of evidentiary and estoppel policy bases. See Wilson v. La
Van, 22 N.Y.2d 131, 238 N.E.2d 738, 291 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1968), noted in 35 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 301 (1969); Comment, The Statute of Frauds and Part Performance in Kansas, 14
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alleged contract. For example, in Scotland, where the form requirements
are very likely the world's most demanding,188 evidence of the defendant's
actions as a partial substitute for form requirements is permitted under
the doctrine of "homologation. " 'nr Georgia'00 and Iowa' 0 ' are in accord
with the Scots' rule at least as to real property transactions. The
Philippines has adopted a traditional version of the Statute of Frauds 1 2
that broadly provides: "Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds ...
are ratified .. .by the acceptance of benefits under them."103 As in the
case of the doctrine of estoppel and part performance, acceptance of
benefits by the defendant provides corroborating circumstantial evidence
of the existence of a contract and, at the same time, is a fact that tends
to aggravate the injustice which could be done by too rigid adherence
to form requirements.
Not all of the escape hatches from the rule of unenforceability, how-
ever, require action pursuant to the contract as corroborating evidence
of the existence of the contract. Constructive trusts may be imposed where
the actions of the parties are not corroborative of the existence of a con-
tract. The rule in such cases is that the plaintiff must establish his case
by more than a preponderance of the evidence.'9 The cases speak of
clear and convincing evidence or of establishing the oral promise beyond
a reasonable doubt.' Nonetheless, even if a promisee could establish
U. Kan. L. Rev. 647 (1966); Note, The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to Oral
Land Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 91 (1964).
188. The following summary is indicative of the pervasiveness of form requirements in
Scotland: "[Clertain types of promises, e.g., promises in contracts relating to inheritance
and personal services, contracts of insurance and guaranty, and assignments of choses in
action, must be founded on 'probative writs,' Le., must be holographic or adopted as
holographic by a statement in the handwriting of the promisor or, if not holographic, must
be witnessed by two signatories who must be designated as witnesses in the writing. Some
other promises, including particularly gratuitous promises, must be proved 'scripto vel
iuramento,' though the writing need not be probative." 1941 Report of the (N.Y.] Law
Revision Comm'n 376 (italics deleted). The pervasiveness of the form requirements, their
complexity, and the availability of exceptions are such that by far the most important
topics in a recent evidence text concern these requirements. See A. Walker & N. Walker,
supra note 94, chs. 10-12, 16-17, 20, 22, 24.
189. W. Gloag & R. Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland 67 (Sth ed. 1968);
A. Walker & N. Walker, supra note 94, at 314-15.
190. Ga. Code Ann. § 37-802 (1962).
191. Iowa Code Ann. § 622.33 (1950).
192. Phil Civil Code art. 1403(2) (Rex ed. 1972).
193. Id. art. 1405.
194. The cases are collected in 9 J. Wignore, supra note 29, at § 2498 n.19.
195. Strype v. Lewis, 352 Mo. 1004, 180 S.W.2d 688 (1944). -.
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his case beyond a reasonable doubt, the constructive trust remedy ordi-
narily is not available in most jurisdictions unless there is a pre-existing
fiduciary or confidential relationship between the promisor and promisee
or proof of fraud.'96 There is no functional reason for this. The rule
stems from the fact that the existence of a fiduciary relationship or the
perpetration of a fraud are grounds for equitable jurisdiction."9 7
It is suggested that many of the exceptions to the rule of unenforcea-
bility could be eliminated and rationalized by the amendment of the
Statute to eliminate the penalty of non-enforceability and to require that
the existence of an agreement within the Statute must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. 9 s Such facts as part performance or
other acts in reliance by the promisee would be circumstantial evidence
toward meeting this high standard of proof. Such an amendment would
be a natural outgrowth of the centuries of judicial attempts to balance the
general policies favoring formalization of contracts and doing justice in
individual cases. It would leave to the trier of fact and to the court,
as guardian of the standard of proof, questions which have become con-
ceptualized questions of law under the doctrines of part performance99
and estoppel. It would extend equitable relief to those victims who were
not in a confidential relationship with the promisor 00 and eliminate the
196. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 49, § 325, at 497-98; R. Newman, Some Re-
flections on the Function of the Confidential Relationship Doctrine in the Law of Trusts, in
Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott 286 (R. Pound, E. Griswold & A.
Sutherland eds. 1964).
197. See 3 3. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity jurisprudence §§ 1044, 1056 (4th ed.
1918).
198. This suggestion is not novel. Bentham long ago suggested that non-compliance
with form requirements ought to be penalized at most by raising a presumption of
spuriousness. 2 J. Bentham, supra note 75, at bk. 4, ch. 3, § 3. Another author tentatively
puts forward a similar suggestion, offering as an alternative that we "enforce only those
contracts which are substantiated by some form of corroboration." Grether, Caveat Prom-
issee: Nebraska's "New Consideration" Test and the Anachronistic Statute of Frauds, 33
Neb. L. Rev. 577, 603 (1954).
199. For an example of the technical nature of the part performance concept, see
Wilson v. La Van, 22 N.Y.2d 131, 238 N.E.2d 738, 291 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1968).
200. "If a true merger of the substantive principles of equity with the main body of
our law, our inner common law, is to take place, as has been the case with rules of pro-
cedure, the principles of equity should be recognized in their entirety. The adoption of
such an approach would mean that in the case of constructive trusts, the underlying prin-
ciple of equity that the law will not aid the unscrupulous in carrying out their plans would
be applied, without qualification, to the solution of the problems we have been discussing,
and would not be limited to cases arising out of breach of a confidential relationship." New-
man, supra note 196, at 300.
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vast flood of litigation over the issue of whether the Statute is satisfied.20'
The issue would shift to the question of whether it is clear that the con-
tract was made, and, if it clearly was, who is responsible for its non-
performance. °s Once the attorneys for the litigants realize that this will
be the issue rather than whether there is a sufficient writing, more realistic
settlement negotiations will be undertaken. At the same time, by holding
plaintiffs to a high standard of proof, the proposed rule would protect
defendants against spurious claims.
When the Statute of Frauds is invoked, very often there is written
evidence of the contract. The issue in such cases is whether the writing is
a sufficient note or memorandum-that is, one which incorporates all
of the essential terms agreed upon. 03 Under the suggestion advanced here,
if there is some evidence in writing of the existence of the contract, the
question for the trier of fact and the trial judge will be whether the
writing coupled with other evidence supplies clear and convincing evi-
dence of the contract.2" 4 This would put an end to litigation which centers
upon the sufficiency of the memorandum even where it is certain that
201. "Under the heading of the Statute of Frauds the century digest has digested
approximately 6,300 cases; the first decennial approximately 2,200 cases; and the second
decennial approximately 2,300 cases." Willis, supra note 53, at 537. A history of contract
in Wisconsin reports, "the Statute did supply the court with an inordinate share of its
contract business." L. Friedman, supra note 25, at 94. A thumbing through any month's
advance sheets of the state and federal reporter systems should satisfy anyone that this
continues to be the case throughout most of the United States.
202. "[The use of the Statute of Frauds as a defense to a contract action is always an
afterthought; parties do not breach a contract merely because the contract is not in full
written form." L. Friedman, supra note 25, at 190-91. In other words, the Statute of
Frauds issue diverts the parties from the crux of their dispute. This diversion produces such
decisions as: "I regret to say that the view which I take of the law in this case compels me
to come to the conclusion that the defendant is entitled to our judgment, although the merits
are entirely against him; . . . and although he was not aware of the objection on which
he now relies, till within a few days before the trial." Sievewright v. Archibald, 117 Eng.
Rep. 1221, 1227 (Q.B. 1851).
203. That the note or memorandum must contain all the essential terms appears not
to have been seriously questioned since the decision of Seagood v. Neale, 93 Eng. Rep. 613
(K.B. 1721); see 4 Williston § 567, 567A. Rabel believes that this interpretation of the
term "note" or '"memorandum" conforms to the spirit of its draftsmen. Rabel, supra
note 56, at 182-83. On the other hand, the litigation concerning the required content of the
note or memorandum has been described as "endless." Revision Committee, supra note 6, at
590 n.4. This description seems to be substantiated by the 200 pages of massively footnoted
text devoted to it in the current edition of Williston. See 4 Williston §§ 566-90.
204. The rule would then be simila to the rule of the French Civil Code, which bars
proof by witnesses if the sum in question exceeds fifty francs, unless there "is a commence-
ment of proof in writing." C. Civ. art. 1347 (56e ed. Petits Code Dalloz 1957) (text set
out in H. deVries & N. Gaston, supra note 123, at 44.)
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there was a contract. 05It would also put the entire Statute of Frauds on
a basis similar to, but not identical with, the writing requirements of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 06
Often, the party invoking the Statute of Frauds would not be prepared
to deny the making of the contract. Rather, he relies on other grounds,
such as failure of condition, impossibility of performance, and the like,
which are much more likely to be at the crux of the dispute. The Statute
is often "afterthought" law in the sense that it is a technical defense sug-
gested by the defendant's attorney after a rupture between the parties
has occurred.20 7 Under the suggestion made here, the existence of the
contract would be a question of fact and thus could be established by an
admission made by the defendant in the pleadings or in other pre-trial
proceedings. In other words, the defendant ultimately could be called upon
to deny or admit under oath that the contract was made. If he admits
the making of the contract the issue of proper formalization is eliminated.
Such a rule exists under the Uniform Commercial Code,208 and a similar
rule apparently existed in England in the first century of the Statute's
existence.20 9 Moreover, several states,210 and the civil law211 have closely
analogous rules.
In brief, by substituting a "clear and convincing evidence" requirement
for the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds, the need to resolve
205. Such a rule would also accommodate proof of contracts by videotape or other
modem methods of information storage. Cf. Sweet, The American Contract System: Today
and 2001, 7 Ind. L. Rev. 309, 338 (1973).
206. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201(1) requires merely that there be "some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made." As the official com-
ments make clear, all the material terms need not be contained in the writing.
207. See note 202 supra.
208. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201(3)(b); see Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App.
94, 147 S.E.2d 374 (1966); Reissman Int'l Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Prods., Inc., 10 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1165 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
209. See the case analysis in Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 Cornell L.Q.
355, 361-71 (1952).
210. Id. at 373-78 (discussing the Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania rules).
211. In France, even if there is no "commencement of proof in writing" as provided
in C. Civ. art. 1347 (56e ed. Petits Code Dalloz 1957), the defendant can be put to a
"decisory oath" to affirm or deny the making of the contract. Id. art. 1360. See P. Herzog
& M. Weser, supra note 15, at 360. A more recent development is that a party's refusal
to answer in an unswom statement whether he has entered into the contract as alleged
is deemed to be a "commencement of proof in writing." C. Civ. art. 1336 (66e Petits Code
Dalloz 1966-67), set out in H. deVries & N. Galston, supra note 123, at 43; see P. Herzog
& M. Weser, supra at 346.
In Scotland, a party may be put to an oath if he raises the defense of certain form
requirements. See A. Walker & N. Walker, supra note 94, at 86-87.
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litigation while excluding material evidence is ended; technical questions
of the type and sufficiency of part performance or the applicability of
other mitigating doctrines are abolished; the dichotomy between the
availability of a remedy in equity but not at law is healed; serious
settlement negotiations are encouraged; candor is demanded; and the
constant flood of cases with respect to the sufficiency of the memorandum,
the integration of several writings, the location of the signature, and the
like, is dammed. At the same time the defendant is well protected against
spurious claims.
V. WITHiN THE STATUTE: A FURTHER REFORM
Even if one accepts the suggestion that the Statute of Frauds would
be improved by substituting for the requirement of a writing a require-
ment that the terms and existence of contracts within its coverage be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, the truth of the charge that
the classes of contract within the Statute are arbitrarily selected212 must
still be considered. The classes of contract within section 4 of the Statute
will be briefly examined.
A. One-Year Section
No one knows why agreements not performable within a year were
selected to be within the Statute. Usually, it is speculated that the
selection of this class was motivated by a policy akin to that of the
statute of limitations, i.e., if the interval between the making of the
promise and its proof in court is overly long, the difficulties of proof make
desirable a more cogent type of evidence than testimony.2 13 If this is
indeed the rationale,214 the Statute serves it poorly. An action based upon
breach of the agreement the day after it was made is hit by the Statute
as hard as an action based upon a breach years later. One could marshall
many other illustrations of the lack of functional logic in the effect of
212. E.g., Grether, supra note 198, at 601; Ireton, supra note 29, at 199; Willis, supra
note 53, passim. Sir William Holdsworth, no admirer of the Statute, who referred to the
teutter want of skill" of its draftsmanship, nonetheless argues that the selection was not
arbitrary by the standards of the seventeenth century. 6 Holdsworth, supra note 1, at
387-88.
213. See 6 Holdsworth 392; Revision Committee 9-10.
214. It seems quite likely however, that as in the case of the other subdivisions the drafts-
men had in mind a transaction type: employment and similar relationships, such as apprentice-
ships and fiduciary retainers. The common law rule was that a general hiring was presumed to
be for a one year term. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *425. But long term apprenticeships,
clerkships, etc. were commonplace.
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the provision2 15 For example, a promise to support the promisee for life
is not within the one-year section even if the promisee lives on for fifty
years because he might have died within the year.1 In New York, a
promise made by a brewery company to a beer distributor that the latter
would have an exclusive distributorship so long as the brewery sold beer
in the area is deemed not within the one-year section.1  On the other
hand, a promise by a brewery company to pay a salesman a commission
on all sales made by the brewery to a designated client so long as the
client purchased beer from the brewery is within the one-year section.218
Any pretense that the one-year section effectively serves an evidentiary
policy akin to the evidentiary policy of the statute of limitations must be
discarded in the light of such decisions. Neither can it be said to serve
efficiently the various functions of form examined in the first part of this
Article. The history of the one-year section is a record of creative attempts
to eviscerate it without departing from the strict letter. Creative decisions,
attempting to minimize the effect of a statutory provision with no clear-
cut policy basis, have led to a quibbler's paradise in which arid distinc-
tions devoid of functional content reign supreme. 10
Dysfunctional litigation focusing upon the question of whether the
alleged contract is on one or the other side of the statutory line would
be sharply reduced if all contracts having more than a certain minimum
215. Revision Committee 9-10; Ireton, supra note 29, at 200; Wills, supra note 53,
at 439-41.
216. Harper v. Harper, 57 Ind. 547 (1877). Similarly, a promise to support a toddler
until the toddler should achieve the age of 21 is not within the Statute. Duncan v. Clarke,
308 N.Y. 282, 125 N.E.2d 569 (1955).
217. North Shore Bottling Co. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 171, 239 N.E.2d
189, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1968).
218. Martocci v. The Greater N.Y. Brewery, Inc., 301 N.Y. 57, 92 N.E.2d 887 (1950);
See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 49, at § 305; Comment, The Cohen Case and the
One Year Provision of the Statute of Frauds, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 720 (1957). The dis-
tinction is that in North Shore Bottling Co. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 171, 239
N.E.2d 189, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1968), the defendant had the power to terminate his
liability within one year and, therefore, his obligation potentially was performable within
one year.
219. In the North Shore case, the court disposes of certain cases decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relied upon by the defendant, as incorrectly decided.
22 N.Y.2d at 177-79 & n.4, 239 N.E.2d at 192-93 & n.4, 292 N.Y.S. at 91-92 & n.4. Thus,
a contract which is to last "as long as I am in the dog food business and you are In the
food brokerage business" need not be in writing. However, a writing is required for a
promise to pay a commission to a salesman so long as the account he obtained remains
active. Zupan v. Blumberg, 2 N.Y.2d 547. 141 N.E.2d 819, 161 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1957). The
story of the litigation centering on the applicability of the one year section is told at length
in 2 Corbin §§ 444-59; 3 Williston §§ 495-504.
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value were to be subjected to the requirements of the Statute. If such a
provision were combined with the proposed "dear and convincing proof"
amendment, the Statute's scope would be considerably broadened while
at the same time its effect would be mitigated.
B. Suretyship Sections
The suretyship provision2so has had a fate similar to that of the one-year
provision, but for different reasons. Unlike the case of the one-year sec-
tion, no general attempt was made to eviscerate the provision, but the
courts have been sympathetic to "the gratuitous 'accommodator,' who had
nothing tangible to gain and everything to lose for his kindness."2'
"On the other hand, puzzling and suggestive exceptions from the statute
appear to depend on the feeling that a surety who has received a dis-
cernible personal benefit in the transaction should be bound by his con-
tract whether or not it is in writing."2"'' From this dichotomy stems the
intricate "main purpose rule" and rules governing joint obligors. As
indicated earlier in this Article, the suretyship promise is one that many
legal systems surround with greater than common evidentiary, caution-
ary, and earmarking guarantees.224 Even England has retained the Statute
of Frauds provision with respect to suretyship. -"
Although some of the distinctions made under this provision have a
functional basis, others apparently do not. Consider the controversies
surrounding the distinction between suretyship and indemnity.20 The
very intricacy of the rules developed by the cases to distinguish between
contracts within and without the Statute raises the question of whether
220. There are, of course, two suretyship provisions. The Statute speaks in terms of
a "special promise" of "any executor or administrator" . . . "to answer damages out of his
own estate.' There then follows a general provision of "any special promise to answer for
the debt, default or miscarriages of another person." 29 Car. 2, c. 3 § 4 (1677). The gen-
eral provision has swallowed up the more specific one in the sense that the promise of the
executor or administrator is deemed to be merely a particular application of the general
provision. Bellows v. Sowles, 57 Vt. 164 (1884); 2 Corbin § 346; Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 179 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7 rev. & ed. 1973). On the historical context of
the provision dealing with the promise of an executor or administrator, see 6 Holdsworth
at 391-92.
221. L. Friedman, supra note 25, at 95.
222. Sharp, supra note 166, at 261.
223. The intricacies are unravelled in Calamari, The Suretyship Statute of Frauds, 27
Fordham L. Rev. 332 (1958), substantially reproduced in J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra
note 49, at §§ 284-93.
224. See text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
225. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
226. See J. Calamari & J. Perrillo, supra note 49, at § 290.
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a more easily administered rule might not be substituted for the present
one. Once again it is suggested that a requirement that all contracts having
a value above a certain minimum be proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence would do much to end dysfunctional litigation concerning the
applicability of the Statute. At the same time, many of the functions
of required formalities would be served as the high standard of proof
would encourage contract formalization.
C. Agreements Made Upon Consideration of Marriage
In contrast to the history of the one-year and suretyship sections of
the Statute, there has been no flood of litigation focusing on the con-
sideration of marriage section. This is doubtless because neither con-
tracts of this kind127 nor allegations of their existence are common. It has
been authoritatively argued that this species of contract was selected for
inclusion within the Statute because it was factually connected with the
transfer of property, and promises to transfer property were within the
Statute.228 Upon this assumption, no separate analysis need be made of
the consideration of marriage section. Whatever the original reasons for
its inclusion in the Statute, a contract within the consideration of mar-
riage clause also is related closely to the promise of the gratuitous
guarantor and gift promises generally. For this reason the discussion
with respect to such promises is applicable here.2 9 To synthesize, a form
requirement is desirable; but a more sensible sanction than unenforcea-
bility ought to be considered.
D. Contracts to Sell Interests in Land
It is quite clear that form functions are particularly important in cases
of land transfers. Even imperial China, noted for the informality of its
law of contracts, imposed form requirements upon land titles. 230 In this
context, the publicity function of form comes to the fore, but the eviden-
tiary, cautionary, earmarking, psychological, and regulatory functions are
often quite important. A promise to transfer has less need of form re-
quirements than the transfer itself inasmuch as the publicity function is of
lesser significance if there has been no actual transfer. Nonetheless, if any
227. The frequency and complexity of marriage settlements in the eighteenth century,
shortly after enactment of the Statute of Frauds, is discussed in R. Robson, The Attorney
in Eighteenth Century England 92-93 (1959). One can speculate that the situation was
similar at the time of enactment.
228. 6 Holdsworth 392.
229. See discussion in text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
230. J. Wigmore, supra note 110, at 174-78.
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kind of contract is to be subjected to form requirements, the contract to
transfer real property ought to be singled out. The mere fact that it is
widely understood in our society that land transactions involve formali-
ties provides a sufficient impetus for legislation with regard to such
formalities. The questions concern the nature of the formal requirement
and the effect of non-compliance. Under the Statute of Frauds the effect
of non-compliance is unenforceability unless the case comes under the
part performance, estoppel, or constructive trust concepts. Once again, the
penalty appears too drastic and the litigation concerning the exceptions
too often dysfunctional. If the focus of the law is shifted to the question
of whether there is clear and convincing evidence of the existence of the
contract, an appropriate balance may be struck between the advantages of
contractual formalization and the needs of justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
While other solutions may suggest themselves,2i it is certain that
"carefully drawn legislation"' 2as would be the appropriate mode of recogni-
tion of the 300th anniversary of the Statute of Frauds. Such legislation
231. For example, the provisions of the Italian Codes which are based upon, but are
a substantial improvement over, the Code Napoleon could be looked to as an alternative
model for reform of the Statute of Frauds. The Civil Code imposes a general rule that
contracts over the value of 5,000 lire may not be proved by testimony, unless the court,
taking into consideration the character of the parties, the nature of the contract and any
other circumstance, in its discretion admits testimonial evidence. Italian C. Civ. art. 2721
(Hoepli 1961) (translated in Beltrarno 693). Moreover, the writing requirement is met by
a beginning of proof in writing, and even this is dispensed with if it was materially or
morally impossible to obtain a writing, or if the writing is lost without fault. Id. art 2724
(translated in Beltramo 693-94). Somewhat stricter requirements apply to contracts of
insurance, reinsurance and compromise agreements. See id. arts. 1888, 1928, 1967 (trans-
lated in Beltramo 465-66, 478, 486). Finally, testimonial evidence is excluded in an action
to prove the existence of other selected agreements, particularly gift promises, real
property contracts, certain special employment terms, id. arts. 782, 1350, 2096 (translated
in Beltramo 211, 349, 518), and arbitration clauses, C. Pro. Civ. art. 807 (Hoepli 1961).
The rigidity of this last series of provisions has, predictably, resulted in the invention of
highly creative fictions by the courts to temper their effects.
232. 3 W'lliston § 448; cf. Sharp, supra note 166, at 262 ("the statute requires
reconsideration and improvement"). Other advocates of reform, although primarily
advocating abolition, are Grether, supra note 198, at 602-03; Hutton, supra note 59, at
306-07; Willis, supra note 53, at 537; Note, An Appraisal of the Utah Statute of Frauds, 9
Utah L. Rev. 978 (1965). An uncompromisingly abolitionist view is expressed in Ireton, supra
note 29, at 201-04. See also R. Heilman, The Conflict of Laws and the Statute of Frauds
105-06 (1961). Corbin, who throughout volume 2 of his treatise treats the Statute with con-
tempt, despairs of its being repealed. 2 Corbin § 275. See also A. Corbin, Frauds, Statute of,
in 6 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 429 (1948).
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must balance the numerous advantages of contractual formalization with
the primary function of the legal system-the doing of justice."" At
present the balance is struck by "technical and artificial rules to govern
what should be a very simple matter. '' 2s4 The solution proposed here,
that all contracts involving more than a specified minimum amount be
brought within the purview of the Statute and that a requirement of
clear and convincing evidence be substituted for the writing requirement,
has the twin virtues of simplicity of formulation and ease of administra-
tion.
233. Professor Fuller has suggested that formal requirements be imposed for "relatively
important transactions," excepting those in "which the guaranties that the formality
would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to the situation out of which the
transaction arises." Fuller, supra note 62, at 805 (emphasis deleted). The drafting of
legislation with this suggested principle in mind would appear to require a degree of
foresight which may be unattainable.
234. Hutton, supra note 59, at 302.
